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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The above entitled Cross-Appeal is from a judgment granted by 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
in favor of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, The court has jurisdiction 
to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(k)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding 
that the evidence at trial concerning fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, and mutual mistake were 
insufficient to warrant rescission of the contract between the 
parties? The standard of review for this issue is a review of 
appropriateness of the exercise of the trial court's discretion. 
Bambrouah v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976); Reeves v. 
Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The standard for reviewing whether the trial court has properly 
exercised its discretion is the following: 
[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of 
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a 
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the 
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the action of the lower tribunal 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah 1976) (citations omitted). 
(2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
the Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, seeking to add 
three causes of action for constructive trust, fraudulent transfer, 
and injunctive relief? The standard of appellate review for this 
issue is the same as for Issue (1) above. 
1 
(3) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
the Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyance, seeking to have the 
conveyance set aside of an interest in a promissory note from 
individuals to their trusts? The standard of appellate review for 
this issue is the same as for Issue (1) above. 
(4) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
the Motion for Order Declaring Trusts Invalid, seeking to have 
trusts declared invalid? The standard of appellate review of this 
issue is the same as for Issue (1) above. 
(5) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to have the 
Counterclaim dismissed as to one party, based upon the doctrine of 
election of remedies? The standard of appellate review for this 
issue is the same as for Issue (1) above. 
(6) Did the trial court commit reversible error in dismissing 
the bankruptcy trustee from this action? The standard of appellate 
review on this issue is the same as for Issue (1) above. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
(1) A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if 
the pleading is one of which no responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the 
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, U.C.A. §25-6-5, the 
full text of which is found in the Addendum to this Brief. 
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(3) A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the 
court shall order that he be made a party. 
Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I, Nature of the Case, This is a breach of contract action 
involving the purchase of a self service carwash in Layton, Utah, 
brought by Cross-Appellant Fairfield Carwash Corporation, f/k/a 
American Vending Services, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Fairfield") 
against Appellant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust ("Trust") 
originally with Wayne L. Morse and Dianne L. Morse improperly 
acting as Trustees, and against the Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable 
Family Trust and the Morses individually (R. at 2-34). The Morses 
and their Trusts also brought a Counterclaim for breach of the same 
contract against Fairfield and seeking individual liability of the 
shareholders of Fairfield, Kevin S. Garn and Douglas M. Durbano 
(R. at 40-44, 206-17). 
II, Course of Proceedings Below, On October 31, 1985, 
Fairfield filed a Complaint against the Morses and their Trusts, 
seeking to rescind an agreement to purchase a carwash, based upon 
misrepresentation and/or mutual mistake (R. at 2-34). On December 
11, 1985, the Morses individually and as Trustees of their Trusts 
answered the Complaint and filed a Counterclaim against Fairfield 
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for breach of contract in failing to make payment on a promissory 
note (R. at 40-44). On November 10, 1988, the Morses were allowed 
by the trial court to file an Amended Counterclaim, naming Gam and 
Durbano as additional Counterclaim Defendants, seeking judgment 
against them individually for the obligations of Fairfield (R. at 
206-17). Prior to trial, the Morses were dismissed individually 
from the action and Brent Dopp was substituted as proper Trustee of 
the Trusts (R. at 1512-14, 1735-38). By stipulation, the Dianne L. 
Morse Irrevocable Family Trust was also dismissed (R. at 1960). 
The Trustee of the Morses' bankruptcy, David Gladwell, was added as 
a Defendant/Counterclaimant (R. at 1001) but later dismissed by the 
court prior to trial (R. at 1735-38). During the protracted 
pendency of this action, a number of motions were filed by all 
parties involved in the litigation. Many of the motions filed by 
Fairfield and/or Gam and Durbano were dispositive. However, some 
of these motions were denied by the court without explanation. 
III. Disposition in the Court Below, At the conclusion of 
the trial of this matter, which commenced on October 15, 1991, the 
trial court granted judgment in favor of the Trust on its 
Counterclaim against Fairfield, dismissed the Trust's claims 
against Durbano and Gam, finding no individual liability for the 
corporate obligation, and dismissed Fairfield's claims against the 
Trust (R. at 2026-28). Although, the Trust sought an award of 
attorney's fees in the amount of $112,435.00, the trial court 
awarded $11,243.00, as a reasonable attorneys fee (R. at 2231-34). 
The lower court also ordered that future pleadings in the action 
should refer to Plaintiff as Fairfield Carwash Corporation, f/k/a 
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American Vending Services, Inc., a copy of which order is found in 
the Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(1) During the summer of 1984, Wayne and Dianne Morse, 
through Morse Construction Company, constructed the Washing Machine 
Carwash ("Carwash"), located at 210/220 North Fairfield Road, 
Layton, Davis County, Utah (R. at 2793). 
(2) The Morses operated the Carwash for approximately one (1) 
year, at which time they entered into negotiations with Fairfield 
for the sale of the Carwash, as an on going business (R. at 2021, 
2791). 
(3) Early in the negotiations on the Carwash, Durbano and 
Garn determined that they would form a corporation to purchase the 
Carwash from the Morses. Throughout the negotiations for the 
purchase, the Morses knew that Durbano and Garn intended to form a 
corporation for this purpose (R. at 2021, 2369-73, 2458, 2496-98, 
2605-06, 2612-13, 2617-18, 2661-66). 
(4) The Morses intended to contract with a corporation, 
rather than with Durbano and Garn individually (R. at 2023, 2458, 
2496-98, 2663, 2868, 2874-76). 
(5) An attorney representing the Morses reviewed the 
transaction documents prior to closing and made no objection to a 
corporate buyer (R. at 2022, 2366-67, 2798-99, 2805-07). 
(6) During the negotiations on the Carwash, Durbano and Garn 
decided on the corporate name American Food Services, Inc., and 
filed Articles of Incorporation with the State of Utah. The 
Articles were rejected and returned because the name American Food 
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Services, Inc., conflicted with an existing corporate name. 
Durbano and Garn then changed the corporate name to American Food 
and Vending Services and submitted Articles of Incorporation a 
second time. The Articles were again rejected because of name 
conflict. Both sets of Articles were submitted prior to July, 1985 
(R. at 2021-22, 2456-57, 2500, 2509, 2582-84). 
(7) On June 28, 1985, Durbano obtained pre-approval for the 
use of the name American Vending Services, Inc., for the 
corporation (R. at 2022, 2365-66). 
(8) Durbano and Garn intended to have the Articles of 
Incorporation on the approved name filed prior to closing but 
failed to accomplish the filing until August 19, 1985, due to the 
distraction of Durbano opening a new law office just prior to the 
closing, the closing itself, and the process of commencing business 
(R. at 2023, 2359-59A, 2456-57, 2582-84, 2661; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1). 
(9) Fairfield was always treated separately from the 
partnership that Durbano and Garn also owned, and the two rejected 
Articles of Incorporation resulted from efforts to form a 
corporation for the purpose of buying the Carwash (R. at 2456, 
2458, 2496, 2498, 2521, 2586, 2605, 2618, 2638, 2648, 2661-66). 
(10) The efforts of Durbano and Garn in filing Articles of 
Incorporation, obtaining pre-approval for the name American Vending 
Services, Inc., and negotiating with the Morses as a corporation 
prior to the closing, constitute a bona fide attempt to organize 
the corporation (R. at 2022). 
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(11) Fairfield was a de facto corporation and a corporation 
by estoppel at the time it purchased the Carwash (R. at 2024). 
(12) None of the documents executed in connection with the 
sale of the Carwash were executed by either Durbano or Gam 
individually (R. at 2022; Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 8, 9, and 11). 
All documents were prepared for a corporate signature "by" "its" 
officers and were signed by officers of the corporation only. The 
buyer was a corporation and all property was sold and conveyed to 
the corporation (R. at 2022, 2024, 2875-76). 
(13) Following the closing, Fairfield continued doing 
business by obtaining a checking account, operating the Carwash, 
issuing stock, and holding meetings (R. at 2022, 2385, 2391-92, 
2403-05, 2463-64, 2553-55, 2618-19, 2638, 2656-59; Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 2, 3, and 4). 
(14) Due to a name change in 1990, American Vending 
Services, Inc. is now known as Fairfield Carwash Corporation (R. at 
2023, 2459; Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). 
(15) On July 10, 1985, the Morses and Fairfield executed an 
Agreement for Purchase and Sale ("Agreement") on the Carwash, 
pursuant to which Fairfield paid a down payment of $20,000.00 and 
executed a Promissory Note in the amount of $45,000.00 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 5 and 8). On that same day, the Morses transferred their 
interest in the Promissory Note to the Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable 
Family Trust and the Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust 
("Trusts") (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). 
(16) Pursuant to the Agreement, the Morses provided to Fair-
field an income statement, an appraisal, and other information 
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concerning the Carwash, which information was later incorporated by 
reference into the Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6 and 7). 
(17) The income statement, appraisal, and other information 
provided to Fairfield, which the Morses' certified as accurate, 
were material facts (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5; R. at 2369, 2378-80, 
2472-74, 2478, 2480-84, 2593-96, 2606-07, 2612-13, 2625-35, 2810). 
(18) The income statement, the appraisal, and the other 
information concerning the Carwash, which were provided by the 
Morses to Fairfield, were false and misrepresented the true value 
and financial expectancy of the Carwash (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7, 
18, 19, 22-27, 29-34; R. at 2403, 2617, 2690, 2699, 2960, 2985). 
(19) Mr. Morse either knew the income was overstated in the 
income statement provided, or he recklessly certified the accuracy 
of the income without any knowledge concerning it (R. at 2836). 
(20) Fairfield relied on the financial statements, appraisal, 
and other information provided by the Morses in deciding to 
purchase the Carwash, which reliance was reasonable (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5; R. at 2379-81, 2473, 2476, 2557-58, 2593-97, 2606-07, 
2612-13, 2625-29, 2632-36, 2801-05, 2843). 
(21) Fairfield was damaged by the misrepresentations in the 
amount of $77,304,20 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 40). 
(22) Three and one half months after the closing under the 
Agreement, Fairfield acted promptly and unequivocally to rescind 
the Agreement and filed this action in the lower court against the 
Morses and their Trusts to rescind the Agreement and for damages 
and tendered the Carwash back to the Morses (R. at 2-34, 2023, 
2386, 2392-2400, 2407). 
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(23) The Morses and their Trusts answered and admitted the 
corporate existence of Fairfield; they also Counterclaimed and 
affirmatively alleged the corporate existence of Fairfield and 
subsequently served a Notice of Default upon Durbano as registered 
agent of Fairfield (R. at 40-44, 2023, 2431; Plaintiff's Exhibit 
41). 
(24) On February 12, 1986, the Morses filed for personal 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, No. 86C-00598. David L. Gladwell was 
appointed Trustee in the proceeding. 
(25) On February 29, 1988, Fairfield voluntarily surrendered 
the Carwash to the first mortgage holder (Ogden First Federal 
Savings and Loan) who then proceeded to foreclose on the property 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13). Neither the Morses nor their Trusts bid 
at the foreclosure sale. 
(26) On October 25, 1988, the Morses and their Trusts were 
granted leave of court to file a third-party action against Durbano 
and Garn individually, alleging that Fairfield lacked corporate 
existence on July 10, 1985 (R. at 206-217). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The overwhelming evidence submitted at trial established 
clearly and convincingly all of the elements of fraudulent 
misrepresentation as required by Utah law. The evidence was even 
stronger in supporting a finding of negligence misrepresentation, 
material breach, and/or mutual mistake. For that reason, the trial 
court should have rescinded the Agreement. 
II. Fairfield's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 
did not raise any new matter and was brought seven months before 
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trial. Based upon the liberal construction that Utah law requires 
of Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Fairfield's Motion 
should have been granted. 
III. Although the Morses sold the Carwash individually, 
simultaneously with the closing, the Morses apparently transferred 
their interest in the Carwash, in the $20,000.00 downpayment and in 
the Promissory Note, to their Trusts, without any consideration 
being paid for the transfer. Seven months later, they filed a 
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Based 
upon the application of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to 
these facts, the trial court should have found this transfer to be 
fraudulent and granted Fairfield's Motion to have the transfer set 
aside. 
IV. Prior to Fairfield's Motion for Order Declaring Trusts 
Invalid, the proper Trustees of the Trusts never acted as such, the 
Morses improperly commandeered the administration of the Trusts 
from inception, and no property was ever delivered to the proper 
Trustees of the Trust. Based upon Utah law, the Trusts should have 
been found by the trial court to be nothing more than a sham. For 
that reason, the trial court should have granted Fairfield's Motion 
to have the Trusts declared invalid. 
V. In response to a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
Durbano and Gam, seeking dismissal of them individually from this 
action, the Morses submitted Affidavits in which they swore that, 
from beginning to end, as far as they knew, they only dealt with 
individuals and not with any corporate entity. This position is 
repugnant and contradictory to any claim the Morses still asserted 
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against Fairfield in their Counterclaim. Based upon the doctrine 
of election of remedies, the trial court should have held the 
Morses to their election and dismissed Fairfield from this action. 
VI. Although the trial court initially granted the Motion to 
add the Morses' Bankruptcy Trustee as the real party in interest in 
this action, such ruling was later reversed, based upon a finding 
that Mr. Gladwell would be precluded from filing a fraudulent 
conveyance action. However, a fraudulent conveyance action would 
be unnecessary had the trial court granted any one of Fairfield's 
Motions, i.e., declaring the trusts invalid, finding the conveyance 
fraudulent, or amending the Complaint to add a cause of action for 
fraudulent transfer. Thus, should this court reverse the trial 
court's decision on any of these other three Motions, Mr. Gladwell 
should also be added as the real party in interest and the only 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
VII. The construction given to U.C.A. §16-10-51 by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 407 P. 2d 
683 (Utah 1965), is still good law in Utah and was properly applied 
by the trial court to the facts of this case. In addition, Vincent 
Drug does not require that Articles of Incorporation be filed 
before a de facto corporation can be found, but only that a bona 
fide attempt to organize the corporation has occurred. Based upon 
Vincent Drug, this court should affirm the trial court's finding 
that Fairfield existed de. facto on July 10, 1985. 
VIII. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel will be applied 
to prevent a party from denying the existence of a corporation if 
they have either (1) dealt with or contracted with it as a 
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corporation, or (2) admitted the corporate existence in an answer 
or counterclaim filed in an action brought by the corporation. 
Since Utah does recognize this doctrine, the trial court properly 
found that as to the parties to this lawsuit, Fairfield was a 
corporation by estoppel at the time of the closing on July 10, 
1985. Although most states have adopted the Model Business 
Corporation Act in one form or another, most states still recognize 
the doctrine of de. facto corporation and almost all states 
recognize the doctrine of corporation of estoppel. For that 
reason, this court should affirm the trial court's finding that 
Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel on July 10, 1985. 
IX. The Trust was not prejudiced by the trial court's 
consideration of responsive memoranda on the issue of attorney's 
fees filed a few days late pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, because the Trust failed to submit the 
matter to the decision of the court by filing a proper Notice. In 
addition, the trial court did not prejudice the Trust by ruling on 
the issue without consideration of a reply memorandum and revised 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees, since the Trust had submitted a belated 
Notice, which it failed to withdraw. Thus, the trial court's award 
of attorney's fees should not be set aside based upon any violation 
of Rule 4-501. 
X. Fairfield's position on its Complaint and Answer to the 
Counterclaim was not untenable or unmeritorious, precluding a 
finding of abuse of discretion in the award of attorney's fees. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). Based upon 
the general principles and practical guidelines set out by the Utah 
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Supreme Court in Dixie State Bankf however, the trial court was 
well within its discretion in awarding attorney's fees in the 
amount of $11,243.00. 
XI. Should Fairfield be successful on this appeal, it should 
be awarded its attorney's fees incurred in the appeal, as well as 
those incurred in the underlying action, including all fees 
incurred on behalf of Durbano and Garn. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Evidence Before the Trial Court was Sufficient to 
Warrant Rescission of the Agreement. 
At the trial of this matter, Fairfield submitted evidence 
justifying rescission of the Agreement based upon: (1) fraudulent 
misrepresentation; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) material 
breach; and (4) mutual mistake. In spite of overwhelming evidence 
supporting all of these theories, the trial court refused to 
rescind the Agreement. Based upon the evidence, as discussed 
below, this court should reverse the trial court and find that 
rescission was warranted. 
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation. 
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are set forth 
clearly in the case of Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 
124 (Utah 1982), as follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning 
a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for 
the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
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(6) that the other party acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage• 
Id- at 126 (citation omitted). Silence may be an actionable 
misrepresentation where it relates to a material matter known to 
one party, and which it is his duty to communicate to the other 
contracting party as a result of a relationship of trust between 
the parties, or as a result of an inequality of the knowledge of 
the parties. Elder v. Clawson, 384 P. 2d 802, 804-05 (Utah 1963); 
See also, Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 
(Utah 1980). 
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly established 
fraudulent misrepresentation. One representation was made in the 
form of a five page income statement on the Carwash, admitted as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Page 4 of the income statement clearly 
represents that the average monthly income on the property was 
projected to be $6,760.83 with office rent, and $5,830.83 without 
office rent, and that the net profit would be at least $20,000.00 
yearly. An additional representation was made in the form of an 
appraisal of the Carwash, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7. The 
testimony of Durbano and Garn clearly established that the repre-
sented income, and value of the Carwash based upon the appraisal, 
were material facts. 
Voluminous evidence was submitted at trial that the misrepre-
sentation of income was in fact false. Durbano, Garn and Mr. Bart 
Kennington all testified that the Carwash never made more than 
$2,400.00 during any one month that they operated it (R. at 2403, 
2617, 2690, 2699). This testimony was also supported by 
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Plaintiff's Exhibits 18, 19, 22 and 24. That the Morses also never 
realized the income represented is supported by the fact that they 
were often late on the first mortgage payment (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
32). The Morse's tax returns for 1984 and 1985, admitted as 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 26 and 29 respectfully, show somewhat higher 
per month income, $4,690.50 for 1984, and $4,500.83 for 1985.l 
However, the deposits made into the Morses' carwash account in 
1984, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 24, were only $18,124.38, 
which is a monthly average of $3,020.73. This figure was confirmed 
by the worksheet subpoenaed from the Morses' accountant, admitted 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 252, showing that the difference between the 
revenue reported on the tax return and the cash deposits consisted 
of $10,019.00 in unidentified non-cash deposits during the year. 
Since all income from a carwash is in coins or currency, the 
additional deposits must have not have been income from the 
Carwash. Mrs. Morse testified that the accountant's worksheet 
showed all the income of the Carwash except for a small amount 
taken out for supplies (R. at 2960). 
1
 Mr. Morse testified at trial that he fraudulently failed to 
report all the Carwash income on his tax returns (R. at 2817-18), 
a fact which, no doubt, affected his credibility at trial. 
2
 The Morses' accountant, Linda Riffle, testified that the 
preliminary total on the deposit summary in her work papers 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 25) matched to the penny the summary of 
deposits to the Carwash account (Plaintiff's Exhibit 24). She 
further testified that the additional income of $10,019 written on 
the work papers came from deposits to other bank accounts and 
subsequent transfers to the Carwash account (R. at 3007-08). 
However, no satisfactory explanation was ever provided at trial as 
to why income from the Carwash would be deposited into a different 
account and then transferred into the Carwash account, as opposed 
to being deposited properly in the first place. 
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In 1985, the worksheet from the Morses' accountant, admitted 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 27, also showed only $12,592.09 in cash 
receipts for 1985, resulting in a monthly average of $2,098.68. In 
addition, the subpoenaed records of water and electricity usage at 
the Carwash, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibits 33 and 34 respect-
ively, reflect comparable usage of both water and electricity by 
the Morses and by Fairfield. Similar utility usage infers similar 
income achieved. Finally, although the income statement 
represented a yearly profit of at least $20,000.00, the Morses' tax 
returns showed losses on the Carwash of $59,084.00 and $27,005.00 
for 1984 and 1985 respectively. Thus, the evidence is overwhelming 
that the income of the Carwash was substantially misrepresented in 
the income statement provided to Fairfield. The drastic reduction 
in the 1988 appraisal from $366,000 to $200,000 also established 
that the original appraisal greatly misrepresented the value of the 
Carwash (Plaintiff's Exhibit 23).3 
Fairfield has always alleged that it would be hard for Mr. 
Morse not to know that the represented income was false. However, 
even in the event Mr. Morse did not know, he testified that he had 
nothing to do with depositing the income from the Carwash (R. at 
2836). Without any knowledge concerning the income of the Carwash 
and the appraisal, his action in certifying that they were accurate 
is certainly reckless conduct, satisfying this element of 
3
 This was due, at least in part, to the fact that the 
appraiser relied totally on information provided to him by Mr. 
Morse in preparing the original appraisal (R. at 2861). 
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fraudulent misrepresentation.4 The purpose of the represented 
income and value, as reflected in paragraph 9(f) of the Agreement5, 
was to induce Fairfield to purchase the Carwash, satisfying element 
number 5 of fraudulent misrepresentation. The Agreement states and 
both Durbano and Gam testified that Fairfield did act in reason-
able reliance and in ignorance of the falsity of the representa-
tions. Mr. Morse also testified that he knew Fairfield would be 
relying on the income statement and appraisal in the purchase of 
the Carwash (R. at 2801-05, 2843). 
At trial, the Morses challenged the reasonableness of Fair-
field's reliance, suggesting that Fairfield should have asked to 
see the Morses' tax returns to clarify the income realized. 
However, Durbano was told by Mr. Morse that not all income was 
included on his tax returns (R. at 2380-81). Thus, Fairfield 
reasonably determined not to ask for the tax returns, because they 
would not accurately represent the income. In reality, the tax 
returns included more income than was actually generated by the 
Carwash, and reliance by Fairfield on them prior to closing would 
have amounted to an additional misrepresentation. The Morses also 
Mr. Morses' motivation in his intentional or reckless 
conduct can be found in his anxiety to close (R. at 2872) because 
of his "dire [financial] straits" at the time of closing (R. at 
2859), resulting in bankruptcy a few months later (R. at 2862-63). 
5
 Paragraph 9(f) of the Agreement states in relevant part: 
"All of the foregoing described documents are true and complete and 
have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
and appraisal principles and each of which accurately presents the 
results of the appraisers and accountants and Sellers represent and 
warrant that they are true and accurate to the best of their 
knowledge, since it is specifically understood that the Buyer has 
substantially relied on these documents in the purchase of the 
above-described assets and property." 
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challenged Fairfield's reasonable reliance on the appraisal, based 
upon the discrepancies found therein. However, as Durbano and Garn 
both testified, the appraisal was based upon projected income, and 
the discrepancy between it and the income statement provided by the 
Morses did not trigger any further investigation (R. at 2481-83, 
2629-30). 
And finally, Fairfield was damaged as a result of the Morses 
fraudulent misrepresentation, a summary of which was admitted as 
Exhibit 40, in the amount of $77,304.20. Thus, all of the elements 
found in Mikkelson for fraudulent misrepresentation were clearly 
established at trial. For that reason, the trial court should have 
ordered rescission of the Agreement. 
B. Negligent Misrepresentation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth very similar elements to 
be proven at an action for negligent representation as follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a 
transaction, (2) is in a superior position to know 
material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes 
a false representation concerning them, (4) expecting the 
other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other 
party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if 
the other elements of fraud are also present. 
Christianson v. Com. Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 
1983). In a later case, the Court ruled that there was no 
additional requirement that the other elements of fraud need be 
established in a negligent misrepresentation case. Price-Orem Inv. 
v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 1986). 
The discussion above on fraudulent misrepresentation need only 
be summarized again to show that negligent misrepresentation was 
also established at trial. Mr. Morse and/or his Trust certainly 
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had a pecuniary interest in this transaction. There is also no 
question that Mr. Morse was in a superior position to know 
materials facts concerning the operation of the Carwash and its 
profitability. Assuming Mr. Morse did not know of the falsity of 
his income representations or the appraisal, his certification to 
their accuracy in the Agreement was certainly a careless or 
negligent act, satisfying element number three. Mr. Morse made 
such representations expecting Fairfield to rely and act thereon, 
which Fairfield reasonably did, suffering damages as outlined 
above. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court 
should have found that Mr. Morse had made negligent representa-
tions for which Fairfield should have been provided a remedy. 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah that the 
plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to "elect to 
rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm 
the transaction and recover damages." Dugan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 
1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). "The choice of remedy belongs to the 
victim of the fraud, and a choice cannot be forced upon him." Id. 
(citations omitted). The only requirement placed upon a plaintiff 
is that, if he desires to rescind the contract upon the ground of 
misrepresentation or fraud, he "must act promptly and unequivocally 
in announcing his intention." Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815 
(Utah 1968). 
The evidence presented at trial clearly established that 
Fairfield did choose to rescind the Agreement promptly and 
unequivocally. Upon discovery of the problem, Durbano contacted 
Mr. Morse immediately by telephone and communicated to him that the 
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Carwash was not bringing in sufficient money to make even the first 
mortgage payment (R. at 2386). Durbano called a meeting at his 
office on October 2, 1985, at which time Mr. Morse made some 
suggestions concerning the operation of the Carwash (R. at 2392-
2400). After trying Mr. Morse's suggestions for another three 
weeks, Durbano met with Mr. Morse at his office and tendered 
possession of the Carwash back to him (R. at 2407). Upon Mr. 
Morse's rejection of the tender, Fairfield immediately filed this 
lawsuit. Thus, Fairfield did act promptly and unequivocally in 
announcing its intention to rescind the Agreement. Based upon 
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, the trial court should 
have found that rescission of the Agreement was proper. 
C. Material Breach of Contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also established that rescission as 
a remedy is available for a material breach of contract as follows: 
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has 
a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an 
alternative to an action for damages where there has been 
a material breach of the contract by the other party. 
What constitutes so serious a breach as to justify 
rescission is not easily reduced to precise statement, 
but certainly a failure of performance which "defeats the 
very object of the contract" or [is] of such prime 
importance that the contract would not have been made if 
default in that particular had been completed" is a 
material failure. 
Polvalvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
Both Durbano and Gam testified that they would not have 
entered into the Agreement but for the income representations made 
and certified by Mr. Morse (R. at 2596-97, 2612-13). The evidence 
at trial established that the income generated by both Mr. Morse 
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and Fairfield in the operation of the Carwash was approximately 
$2,400.00 per month. The represented income was $5,800.00 per 
month, more than twice the actual income. The trial court should 
have found that such a great discrepancy between represented income 
and actual income was a material breach of the Agreement. Based 
upon such material breach, Fairfield should have been permitted to 
rescind the Agreement. 
D. Mutual Mistake. 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Fairfield should 
also have been permitted to rescind the Agreement for mutual 
mistake. The doctrine of mutual mistake applies where both parties 
are mistaken concerning an existing fact, on which the parties 
based their contract. Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 
1982); Smith v. Pearman, 548 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Utah 1976). The 
remedy of rescission of contract may be granted when mutual mistake 
is proven. Id. 
The evidence presented at trial clearly established, as 
outlined above, that the representation of income made to Fairfield 
before and as part of the Agreement was inaccurate.6 Even if the 
evidence was insufficient to establish fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation, in the very least, the evidence established that 
the parties made a material mistake concerning the level of income 
produced by the Carwash. Upon proof of this mutual mistake, the 
trial court should have rescinded the Agreement. Therefore, based 
upon the evidence presented at trial on fraudulent and negligent 
6
 The Morses' own accountant even testified that they were not 
good bookkeepers (R. at 2985). 
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misrepresentation, material breach and mutual mistake, Fairfield 
asks that this court reverse the trial court and find that 
Fairfield is entitled to rescission of the Agreement. 
II. 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying 
Fairfield's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. 
On March 14> 1991, Fairfield filed a Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint, with an accompanying Memorandum. The trial 
court subsequently denied the Motion without providing any basis 
for the denial. Such denial was an abuse of discretion and should 
be reversed by this court. 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for 
amendment of pleadings by leave of court, which "leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." Furthermore, Rule 15(a) 
"is to be liberally construed so as to further the interests of 
justice," particularly if an amendment is sought before trial. 
Girard v. Applvbv, 660 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). "A prime 
consideration in determining whether an amendment should be 
permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party 
to meet the newly raised matter." Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 
98 (Utah 1981). In the case at bar, the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow Fairfield to amend the Complaint. 
The proposed Amended Complaint added three causes of action 
for (1) imposition of a constructive trust, (2) declaration of a 
fraudulent transfer, and (3) injunctive relief. The facts under-
lying these causes of action are identical to the facts underlying 
the original causes of action for misrepresentation and mutual 
mistake. A liberal construction of Rule 15(a), as required by 
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Girard, suggests that the amendment should have been allowed. In 
addition, the Morses were put on notice of the proposed Amended 
Complaint by the allegations already in the Complaint, including 
that the Morses made fraudulent misrepresentations in order to 
induce Fairfield to enter into the Agreement and to pay $20,000.00 
down. Even if the additional causes of action were considered new, 
the trial of this matter was not held until October 15, 1991. For 
that reason, the Morses had ample opportunity to meet the "newly 
raised matter," as required in Lewis. For that reason, Fairfield 
urges this court to reverse the trial court and allow the proposed 
Amended Complaint. 
III. 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying 
Fairfield's Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyance. 
On April 17, 1991, Fairfield brought a Motion before the trial 
court with an accompanying Memorandum seeking to have the court set 
aside the fraudulent conveyance by the Morses to their Trusts of 
their interest in the Carwash, in the $20,000.00 down payment, and 
in the promissory note in the amount of $45,000.00. Subsequently, 
the trial court denied Fairfield's Motion, again without providing 
to the parties any basis upon which the Motion was denied. Such 
denial was an abuse of discretion, and Fairfield urges this court 
to reverse the denial of its Motion and set aside the fraudulent 
transfer. 
On July 10, 1985, the Morses individually sold the Carwash to 
Fairfield (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.) The Warranty Deed transferring 
the property was also executed by the Morses individually (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 9.) However, the All-inclusive Promissory Note and 
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Trust Deed, which were prepared by American Title at the time of 
closing, were made in favor of the Trusts (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.) 
The only conclusion which can be reached from this evidence is that 
simultaneously with the closing, the Morses transferred their 
interest in the Carwash, in the $20,000.00 down payment, and in the 
promissory note, to their Trusts. No evidence was submitted to the 
trial court that any consideration was ever paid for said transfer. 
On February 12, 1986, the Morses filed a petition for relief in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, under Case No. 
86-00598-GEC, without listing their Counterclaim in this lawsuit or 
any interest in the Carwash as property of the estate. The 
transfer of their interests as stated above to their Trusts was a 
fraudulent conveyance and should be set aside. 
§25-6-5 of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which is 
applicable to this transfer, defines fraudulent transfer as 
follows: 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the 
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made 
the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud any creditor of 
the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or 
reasonably should have believed that he 
would incur, debts beyond his ability to 
pay as they became due. 
U.C.A. §25-6-5. Paragraph (2) of §25-6-5 provides criteria to be 
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used by the court in determining actual intent under paragraph 
(l)(a), including the following relevant criteria: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was 
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; and 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred. 
The trial court should have found the transfer by the Morses to 
their Trusts of the interests identified above to be fraudulent 
pursuant to both subparagraphs (l)(a) and (b). 
The Morses transferred their interest in the Carwash, the 
promissory note and the $20,000.00 down payment without receiving 
any consideration from the Trusts. Based on their bankruptcy 
filing only seven months after the transfer was made, the Morses 
reasonably understood that they had already incurred debts beyond 
their ability to pay as they became due. Thus, the transfer was 
fraudulent based upon §25-6-5(1)(b). 
Application of §25-6-5(2) reveals that the Morses also made 
the transfer with "actual intent" to hinder, delay, or defraud 
their creditors. The criteria which apply in this situation are as 
follows: 
(a) The transfer was to an insider—the transfer 
was to the family Trusts, with the Morses apparently 
acting as Trustees, clearly an insider transfer. 
(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer—acting as Trustees of 
the family Trusts, the Morses retained total possession and 
control of the interest transferred to the Trusts. 
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(h) The value of the consideration received by the 
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred—clearly the Morses exhibited actual intent based 
on the fact that no consideration was received by them for the 
interest transferred to the Trusts. 
(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made—the Morses insolvency at the time 
of this transfer or shortly thereafter resulted in their 
petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, only seven months after the 
transfer was made. 
Actual fraudulent intent can be inferred from the presence of 
the above "badges of fraud." Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 
420, 423 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). All of the above "badges 
of fraud" are evident in the transfer by the Morses to their Trusts 
of the above referenced interests. Thus, the trial court should 
have also found the transfer to be fraudulent based upon §25-6-
5(l)(a). 
The Morses argued before the trial court that the Motion 
should be denied because fraudulent conveyance had not been pled in 
the Complaint. However, a request to set aside a fraudulent 
conveyance may be brought by motion, without the necessity of prior 
pleadings concerning it. Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 
1974). In addition, the fraudulent conveyance statute "should be 
construed with liberality so as to reach all artifices and evasions 
designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect in preventing 
debtors from paying the just claims of their creditors." Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P. 2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). In furtherance of that 
policy, the trial court should have found that the Morses transfer 
of their interests in the Carwash, the $20,000.00 down payment and 
the $45,000.00 promissory note was fraudulent pursuant to both 
sections (a) and (b) of §25-6-5(1) of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent 
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Transfer Act. For that reason, Fairfield asks that this court 
reverse the trial court's denial of its Motion and set aside the 
transfer as fraudulent. 
IV. 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying 
Fairfield's Motion for Order Declaring Trusts Invalid. 
On April 19, 1991, Fairfield filed a Motion for Order 
Declaring Trusts Invalid, with an accompanying Memorandum. The 
trial court subsequently denied the Motion without providing any 
basis for the denial. Such denial was an abuse of discretion and 
should be reversed by this court. 
On or about January 15, 1984, the Morses as Settlors and 
Scott Buehler as Trustee executed Trust Agreements entitled Dianne 
L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust and Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable 
Family Trust, copies of which were admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibits 
36 and 37. Although the Carwash was sold by the Morses 
individually (Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 9-11), the All-inclusive 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed were in favor of the Trusts 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Since the Morses had represented 
themselves as Trustees on the All-inclusive Promissory Note, 
Fairfield named the Morses both individually and as Trustees when 
the Complaint was filed on October 31, 1985. On December 11, 1985, 
the Morses answered the Complaint and filed a Counterclaim, both 
individually and as Trustees of the Trusts, in spite of the fact 
that Mr. Buehler was Trustee at the time. On February 10, 1986, 
Mr. Buehler resigned as Trustee of both Trusts. (Deposition of J. 
Scott Buehler, pp. 16-17, found in the Addendum to this Brief.) 
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Although the Trusts named Brent A. Dopp as successor trustee, 
Mr. Dopp had absolutely no knowledge concerning the Trusts or this 
lawsuit at the time Fairfield brought its motion to have the Trusts 
declared invalid on April 19, 1991. (Deposition of Brent Dopp, pp. 
4-5, 8-10, found in the Addendum to this Brief.) Pursuant to 
Fairfield's Motion, the trial court should have declared the Trusts 
invalid, the effect of which would have been to make the Morses' 
Bankruptcy Trustee, David Gladwell, the true party in interest in 
this action. 
In the clear and well reasoned opinion in Continental Bank v. 
Country Club Mobile Est., 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981), former Justice 
Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court definitively stated the law in Utah 
on Trusts and a settlor's power over trust property after creation 
of a trust. Justice Oaks' knowledge on trusts, as a former 
professor of trust law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University, adds additional weight to his opinion. 
In Continental Bank, the settlor conveyed certain real 
property to a trustee in trust for various members of his family. 
However, in contravention of the trust agreement, the settlor later 
granted a third, party, who was leasing the real property, an 
extension on a previously granted option to buy. The trustee 
brought an action against the optionee to quiet title to the 
property, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment on 
the issue of the validity of the extension. The District Court 
granted the optionee's motion, but the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that: 
If we gave legal effect to the settlor's extension of 
this option in contravention of the existence and terms 
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of the trust, we would prejudice the interests of the 
beneficiaries, blur some fundamental principals of trust 
law, and cast doubt upon whether it is the trustee or the 
settlor who is empowered to manage and dispose of the 
trust property in a valid revocable trust. 
Id. at 872. Although the facts in Continental Bank are not 
identical with those on appeal before this court, the law in Utah 
on Trusts, as concisely stated by Justice Oaks in his opinion, is 
most helpful in the court's determination of this issue. 
When the Morses executed the Trust Agreements on January 15, 
1984, they created entities apart from themselves which were 
capable of property ownership. From that date forward, any 
properties vested in the Trusts would have to be transferred to Mr. 
Buehler or his successor, as Trustee. However, even before Mr. 
Buehler resigned as Trustee of the Trusts, the Morses have 
attempted to transfer their interests in the promissory note to 
themselves as Trustees of their Trusts. They also represented 
themselves as Trustees of the Trusts to their original counsel and 
to the trial court in filing an Answer and Counterclaim in this 
action, all before Mr. Buehler's resignation. This is a flagrant 
violation of trust law as explained by Justice Oaks in this way: 
A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal 
title to property is vested in a trustee, who has 
equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries. It is therefore axiomatic in trust 
law that the trustee under a valid trust deed has 
exclusive control of the trust property, subject only to 
the limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument, 
and that once the settlor has created the trust he is no 
longer the owner of the trust property and has only such 
ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him 
in the trust instrument. . . . After a settlor has 
completed the creation of a trust he . . .has no 
liabilities or powers with regard to the trust 
administration. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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The Trust Agreements, which were admitted before the trial 
court as Plaintiff's Exhibits 36 and 37, state in Article II: 
This Trust cannot be altered, amended, revoked or 
terminated by the Settlor, and the Settlor retains no 
beneficial interest vested or contingent hereunder. 
The Trust Agreements granted all power of their administration to 
the Trustee. However, in contravention of this provision, the 
Morses commandeered the administration of these Trusts long before 
Mr. Buehler's resignation and, no doubt, even from inception. This 
course of conduct has included transfer of their interest in the 
promissory note to themselves as Trustees, hiring counsel on behalf 
of the Trusts to defend this action, bringing a Counterclaim in 
this action, and continuing to represent the Trusts in this action, 
even after being dismissed individually. Based upon the 
depositions of Mr. Buehler and Dr. Dopp, it is clear that neither 
of them, as proper trustees, ever administered the Trusts. 
It should be clear from the evidence before the trial court 
that the Morses have perpetuated a colossal fraud not only upon 
Fairfield, but also upon the proper Trustees of the Trusts, upon 
their counsel, and upon the trial court. In addition, it is also 
clear that neither the promissory note, nor any other property for 
that matter, was ever delivered to either of the proper Trustees of 
the Trusts. Creation of a trust clearly requires delivery of 
property into the trust. Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 759 
(Utah 1985). The Morses' failure to ever deliver any property 
into their Trusts is also sufficient grounds to declare the Trusts 
invalid. 
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All the evidence before the trial court made it clear that the 
Trust Agreements executed by the Morses were never more than a sham 
and should have been disregarded. "[I]f the settlor reserves a 
substantial interest or unbridled control over management of the 
operations, . . . the trust may be found to be a illusory. 
Subsequently, the settlor remains the owner of the property and 
there is no beneficiary." Roberts v. So. Oklahoma City Hosp. 
Trust, 742 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Okla. 1986). Since the Trusts at 
issue were only illusory and not real entities, the interest in the 
promissory note proportedly transferred to the Trusts was always 
the property of the Morses individually and therefore falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Trustee in the Morses' bankruptcy 
proceeding. As a result, the Trusts should be declared by this 
court to be invalid and the Bankruptcy Trustee reinstated as the 
real party in interest in this lawsuit. 
V. 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying 
Fairfield's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Seeking 
Dismissal of the Counterclaim as to Fairfield by the 
Doctrine of Election of Remedies. 
On April 30, 1991, Fairfield brought a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment before the trial court, seeking to have the 
Morses' Counterclaim dismissed as to Fairfield by application of 
the doctrine of election of remedies. Subsequently, the trial 
court denied Fairfield's Motion without providing the parties a 
basis for the denial. The trial court should have granted the 
Motion and dismissed the Counterclaim as to Fairfield, based upon 
the doctrine of election of remedies. 
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The general rule has been stated to be that where a 
party has grounds to bring different actions arising out 
of the same state of facts against different persons, and 
the maintenance of one action necessitates the allegation 
of a fact inconsistent with the maintenance of another, 
he is bound by his election, and cannot proceed against 
the other person. 
Annotation, Doctrine of election of remedies as applicable where 
remedies are pursued against different persons, 16 A.L.R. 601, 607 
(citations omitted). 
When a party has a cause of action against different entities, 
and he alleges a fact or assumes a position in one cause of action 
against one party which is inconsistent with or is repugnant to a 
fact or position that is necessary to the other cause of action, 
the party must elect which cause of action he will pursue. Autocar 
Sales & Service Co. v. Holscher, 11 S.W.2d 1072, 1074 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1928). The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this doctrine, 
stating that the "doctrine of election of remedies applies as a bar 
only where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based upon 
incompatible facts; ..." Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp., 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah 1955). The doctrine of 
election of remedies should have been applied by the trial court in 
granting Fairfield's Motion, due to the inconsistent positions 
which the Morses have taken concerning their claims against Fair-
field and against Durbano and Garn individually. 
The inconsistency became obvious when, on August 17, 1990, 
Durbano and Garn moved the trial court for summary judgment, 
seeking dismissal of them individually from the action. In 
response to that motion, the Morses filed Affidavit's with the 
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court (R. at 725-29, 736-40), in which the Morses swear to the 
following: 
(a) During negotiations for the sale of the Carwash, the 
Morses dealt solely with Durbano and Garn. 
(b) DurbanO and Garn represented to the Morses that they were 
purchasing the Carwash as individuals. 
(c) The Morses were never made aware of the existence of any 
separate business entity independent of Durbano and Garn at 
any time during the negotiations for the sale of the Carwash. 
(d) At the closing of the Carwash sale, the sale documents 
which were prepared by Durbano and Garn set forth the name 
American Vending Services, Inc., as the purchaser. 
(e) The Morses immediately inquired of Durbano and Garn 
regarding the inclusion of American Vending Services, Inc., as 
the purchaser. 
(f) Durbano and Garn indicated to the Morses that they wanted 
the Carwash to be in the name of American Vending Services, 
Inc., that American Vending Services, Inc., was a business 
name used by Durbano and Garn, and that American Vending 
Services, Inc., was not a separate corporate entity. Durbano 
and Garn further assured the Morses that the Carwash was being 
sold to Durbano and Garn who were just using the name of 
American Vending Services, Inc., to do business. 
(g) At all times prior to and subsequent to the closing, the 
Morses believed that they were dealing with Durbano and Garn 
as individual purchasers of the Carwash. 
The Morses have sworn in their Affidavits that, from beginning 
to end, as far as they knew, they were only dealing with 
individuals in the sale of the Carwash, and not with any corporate 
entity. Clearly this position is repugnant and contradictory to 
any claim the Morses may have against Fairfield as alleged in their 
Counterclaim. Thus, pursuant to Autocar Sales, the Morses have 
made their election and their Counterclaim should have been 
dismissed as to Fairfield. 
The Utah Supreme Court also discussed the doctrine in Royal 
Resources v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979), in 
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which the parties entered into a stipulation that the plaintiff 
could take judgment against the corporate dependant and, in the 
event of no recovery, then proceed against the individual defen-
dants. The Court found the stipulation to be at variance with, and 
refused to invoke, the doctrine of election of remedies, stating: 
It is noteworthy that, except for the stipulation, had 
plaintiff chosen to take judgment against [the corporate 
defendant], such may well have been viewed as an election 
of remedies, and if properly raised as a defense, it 
would have obviated the necessity of trial and this 
appeal. 
Id. at 796. Based upon the Morses' election to pursue Fairfield, 
and pursuant to Royal Resources, the trial court should have 
dismissed Fairfield by application of the doctrine of election of 
remedies. 
The Morses' sworn statements in their Affidavits are binding 
and cannot subsequently be contradicted by other factual 
allegations. Premier Elec. Const, v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 477 N.E.2d 
1249, 1256 (111. Ct. App. 1984). In order to maintain their 
Counterclaim against Fairfield, the Morses must now allege that the 
corporation was validly existing and did indeed execute the 
Agreement and promissory note. This fact is completely 
incompatible to the facts referenced above to which the Morses have 
previously sworn. Thus, based on Farmers & Merc. Bank, the 
existence of incompatible facts requires that the Morses elect 
their remedy. Based upon the Morses' Affidavits, they have elected 
their action and now may only pursue the individuals. For that 
reason, Fairfield asks that this court reverse the trial court's 
denial of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and find that, 
prior to trial, the Counterclaim should have been dismissed as to 
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Fairfield. Thus, when Fairfield's existence was proven at trial, 
the Morses' Counterclaim should have been dismissed in its 
entirety. 
VI. 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Dismissing 
the Morses' Bankruptcy Trustee, David Gladwell, From This 
Action. 
On November 19, 1990, Fairfield, Durbano and Garn filed a 
Motion in the trial court for Leave to Join the Morses' Bankruptcy 
Trustee, David L. Gladwell, as a Defendant/Counterclaimant in this 
action. On January 15, 1991, the trial court granted the Motion. 
However, on July 30, 1991, the trial court reversed its decision 
and dismissed Mr. Gladwell from the action. Such dismissal was an 
abuse of discretion, in that Mr. Gladwell should be the real party 
in interest in this action. 
The Motion to join Mr. Gladwell was brought pursuant to Rule 
19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a 
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the 
court shall order that he be made a party. 
In this action, Mr. Gladwell, as Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee 
in Bankruptcy No. 86C-00598, reopened the Morses' Bankruptcy on 
April 23, 1989, in order to pursue any assets that could be brought 
into the estate as a result of litigating this action. Since Mr. 
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Gladwell is located in Ogden, he is subject to service of process 
of the court and would not deprive the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction nor render the venue improper. In addition, as 
Trustee of the Morses' Bankruptcy, he did claim an interest in the 
outcome of this action and his ability to protect that interest 
would have been impaired or impeded if he were not joined as a 
party. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 19 (a), he was a proper party 
and was properly joined by the court in its original grant of the 
Motion. 
The trial court later dismissed Mr. Gladwell from the action, 
based on its ruling that he would be precluded from filing a 
fraudulent conveyance action. The dismissal of Mr. Gladwell was in 
conjunction with the trial court's denial of Fairfield's Motions 
(1) seeking an order that the Trusts were invalid, (2) to set aside 
the fraudulent conveyance, and (3) to amend the Complaint to add a 
cause of action for fraudulent transfer. Had the trial court 
granted any one of these other three Motions, the trial court 
should have also granted the Motion to add Mr. Gladwell, as he 
would be the only real party in interest. Thus, should this court 
reverse the trial court's decision on any of the other three 
Motions, such action would also support reversal of this Motion to 
add Mr. Gladwell, and this court should find that he is the real 
party in interest and the only Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
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ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
VII. 
The Doctrine of De Facto Corporation was Not Abolished by 
the Utah Business Corporation Act and was Properly 
Applied by the Court Below. 
The Morses argue in their opening Brief that the common law 
doctrine of de facto corporation was abolished by the Utah Business 
Corporation Act, which was enacted in 1961. The Morses cite the 
Model Business Corporation Act7 in support of this proposition, and 
their Brief relies heavily upon an Oregon case, Timberline Equip-
ment Co. Inc. v. Davenport, 514 P. 2d 1109 (Or. 1973), in an effort 
to convince this court to follow suit. What the Morses fail to 
advise this court is that the Oregon statute governing this issue 
is significantly different from the Utah statute. 
In Timberline8, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon 
Business Corporation Act precluded the common law doctrine of de 
facto corporation. However, the Court was construing ORS 57.793, 
which states: 
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without 
the authority of a certificate of incorporation issued by 
the Corporation Commissioner, shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred 
or arising as a result thereof. 
ORS 57.793 (emphasis added). In comparison, §16-10-139 of the Utah 
Business Corporation Act states: 
7
 See discussion of the Model Act and its influence on the 
doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel on 
pp. 55-57 of this Brief. 
8
 The Oregon Supreme Court in Timberline found the Utah 
Supreme Court's opinion in Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm., 407 P.2d 683 (Utah 1965) unpersuasive. In like manner, this 
court may find the opinion of Timberline equally unpersuasive. 
37 
All persons who assume to act as a corporation 
without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising 
as a result thereof. 
U.C.A. §16-10-139 (emphasis added). 
The distinction between the statutes could not be clearer. 
Obviously, the Oregon legislature fully intended to abolish the 
doctrine of de facto corporation in Oregon through the enactment of 
its statute. However, on the contrary, the Utah legislature 
enacted §16-10-139 without any specific language referring to a 
certificate of incorporation. Thus, the Utah statute can be read 
to allow persons to act as a corporation if authorized to do so by 
the doctrine of de facto corporation. In like manner, U.C.A. §16-
10-519, the other statute cited by the Morses, can be read to mean 
that the de jure existence of a corporation commences upon issuance 
of a certificate of incorporation, which does not preclude a 
corporation from existing de facto prior to that time. 
This is precisely the interpretation given to §16-10-51 by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 407 
P.2d 683 (Utah 1965). In Vincent Drug, the Court stated as 
follows: 
Although, under the provisions of Sec. 16-10-51, 
U.C.A.1953, a corporation begins to exist upon the 
issuance of the certificate of incorporation, and such 
charter is conclusive evidence that all conditions 
precedent have been complied with, it does not follow 
that a corporation cannot exist before such issuance of 
a certificate of incorporation. Where a bona fide 
attempt to organize a corporation under a valid law has 
been made, and the incorporators have done business as 
such a corporation, and but for some unintentional formal 
9
 §16-10-51 states in relevant part: "upon issuance of the 
certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall 
begin,..." 
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defect there would be a de jure existence, the 
association is a de facto corporation and its existence 
as a corporation cannot as a rule be inquired into 
collaterally. 
Id. at 684 (footnote omitted). Thus, Utah law recognizes the 
doctrine of de facto corporation, and the trial court properly 
applied the doctrine in this action. 
The Morses have misstated the facts of Vincent Drug, 
stretching the opinion in that case to include a requirement that 
Articles of Incorporation be filed before a de facto corporation 
can be found. A close examination of Vincent Drug reveals that 
there is no such requirement under Utah law. The undisputed facts 
in Vincent Drug were clearly stated by the Court as follows: 
(1) Articles of Incorporation were filed on January 2, 
1962. 
(2) After that date, Vincent Drug Company conducted business 
as a corporation. 
(3) Before becoming aware of the defect in the Articles, 
Vincent Drug Company had elected to conduct its business 
on a fiscal year ending March 31. 
(4) Presumably within a few days after January 2, 1962, the 
Articles were returned to the corporation's counsel for 
failure to include street addresses of the incorporators 
and directors. 
(5) Tax returns were filed for the first quarter of 1962, 
presumiably sometime in mid April, 1962. 
(6) Corrected Articles were filed shortly before May 21, 
1962, on which date the Secretary of State recorded the 
Articles of Incorporation. 
Id. at 683-84. 
It is clear from the above stated facts that Vincent Drug 
Company was well aware in April, 1962, at the time of filing its 
initial tax return, that the Articles of Incorporation had been 
returned. That knowledge would have been either direct or imputed 
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to Vincent Drug Company from receipt of the defective Articles by 
the corporation's counsel. IdL at 683. With that knowledge, the 
tax return was filed, and it wasn't until May, 1962, that proper 
Articles were filed. In Vincent Drug, the Utah Supreme Court found 
that (1) a bona fide attempt to organize a corporation had been 
made, (2) the incorporators had done business as the corporation, 
and (3) there was an unintentional formal defect that prevented de 
jure existence, and the Court ruled that Vincent Drug Company was 
a de facto corporation. Id., at 684. 
The facts underlying the opinion in Vincent Drug are almost 
identical to the facts in the case at bar. It is undisputed that 
prior to July of 1985, counsel for Fairfield filed Articles of 
Incorporation under two different names, American Food Services, 
Inc. and American Food and Vending Services, Inc. However, prior 
to July 10, 1985, both filings were returned because of name 
conflicts. Also prior to July 10, 1985, Articles of Incorporation 
using an approved name were drafted but were not executed until 
August 1, 1985 and not filed until August 19, 1985. The primary 
reason that the Articles were not filed prior to July 10, 1985, was 
because the corporation's counsel was moving his office and was 
busy and distracted. Notwithstanding knowledge that the Articles 
formerly filed had been returned, Fairfield executed the Agreement, 
promissory note and trust deed on July 10, 1985. These facts are 
as nearly identical to the facts of Vincent Drug as two cases can 
be. For that reason, this court should affirm the trial court's 
finding that Fairfield also made a bona fide attempt to organize a 
corporation prior to July 10, 1985. 
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The other two elements, identified in Vincent Drug as 
prerequisites to the finding of de facto corporation, are also 
satisfied in the case at bar. The second element is that the 
incorporators have done business as a corporation. The evidence 
at trial established that the incorporators executed documents on 
the purchase of the Carwash in the name of the corporation, opened 
a corporate bank account, hired a manager, and began holding 
corporate meetings, all before the corporation existed de. jure on 
August 19, 1985. After that date, the incorporators continued to 
conduct the business as a corporation, including holding the 
organizational and other corporate meetings, having discussions 
with Mr. Morse concerning the problems with the Carwash, and 
filing this lawsuit. These facts establish definitively that the 
incorporators did business as a corporation, satisfying the second 
element of Vincent Drug. 
The third element to be satisfied is that but for some 
unintentional formal defect, there would be de jure existence. The 
Morses argue in their Brief that this element is not satisfied 
because the Articles of Incorporation that were filed on August 19, 
1992, contained no defect. However, this is not the defect 
involved, nor was it the defect in Vincent Drug. The defect in 
both cases was that Articles had been filed and returned, and 
corrected Articles had not been filed prior to doing the act upon 
which the corporate existence was challenged. Thus, it is clear 
that all three elements are satisfied in the case at bar and, 
pursuant to Vincent Drug, this court should affirm the 
corporation's de facto existence on July 10, 1985. 
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The Morses argue that to apply Vincent Drug in affirming the 
trial court's ruling of de facto corporation would allow parties to 
simply use "inc." on any contract signed and later claim that they 
intended to file Articles of Incorporation but simply were too busy 
to do so. This argument misses the whole basis of the doctrine of 
de facto corporation. In the absence of evidence of good faith 
efforts to incorporate prior to signing a document, the doctrine of 
de facto corporation is not available. Thus, the Morses' concern 
over a huge loop hole in the Corporation Act by application of the 
doctrine of de facto corporation is misplaced. The two filings by 
Fairfield prior to July 10, 1985, in combination with the 
establishment of de jure existence on August 19, 1985, firmly 
support the trial court's finding of de facto corporation. 
The Morses cite many cases in their Brief dealing with 
situations where no Articles of Incorporation had ever been filed 
prior to the act upon which the corporate existence is challenged. 
None of these cases are persuasive, due to the two good faith 
filings by Fairfield, which were rejected prior to July 10, 1985. 
The Morses also state in their Brief that these two prior filings 
were for a partnership as opposed to the corporation. However, 
this allegation is not supported by the evidence. Durbano and Garn 
both testified that the partnership and the corporation were always 
separate entities, and that the two prior rejections resulted from 
efforts to form a corporation to purchase the Carwash. Thus, this 
argument is also not persuasive. For that reason, this court 
should affirm the trial court's finding of de facto corporation on 
the closing date of July 10, 1985. 
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The Morses further argue in their Brief that until a 
certificate of incorporation is issued, an individual who signs on 
behalf of a corporation is personally liable, citing Gillham 
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977). 
However, the Morses' emphasis on Gillham is misplaced. In that 
case, there was no corporation de, jure, de facto, or by estoppel. 
Id. at 166. Obviously, an individual who signs on behalf of a 
totally non-existent corporation is personally liable, pursuant to 
U.C.A. §16-10-139. However, Gillham is not persuasive in the case 
at bar, due to the fact that Fairfield existed de facto and by 
estoppel on July 10, 1985, and de jure on August 19, 1985. For all 
the reasons stated above, this court should affirm the trial 
court's finding of de facto corporation. 
VIII. 
The Trial Court Properly Found Fairfield to be a 
Corporation by Estoppel, Which Doctrine was also Not 
Abolished by the Utah Business Corporation Act. 
The Morses argue in their Brief that the Model Act also 
abolished the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, citing in 
particular Robertson v. Lew, 197 A. 2d 443 (D.C. 1964). However, 
the Morses have failed to disclose to this court that the same 
appellate panel from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
which held that corporation by estoppel was no longer viable under 
their corporation act in Robertson, two years later held that a 
party was estopped to deny the existence of a corporation in 
Namerdv v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 112 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966). It 
is also interesting to note that the Oregon case upon which the 
Morses rely so heavily on the issue of de facto corporation has 
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dropped out of their argument. This is because the Oregon Supreme 
Court recognized the doctrine of corporation by estoppel in 
Timberline, supra, 514 P. 2d at 1112. 
The Morses also cite an Arizona case in support of this issue, 
Booker Custom Packing Co. Inc. v. Sallomi, 716 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1986). However, in Booker, the court did not address 
corporation by estoppel, but found that the defendant's request for 
non-liability was inconsistent with A.R.S. §10-146, a statute 
similar to U.C.A. §16-10-139. id. at 1063. This does not preclude 
the Arizona courts from invoking the doctrine of corporation by 
estoppel, just as the court's in Oregon and the District of 
Columbia have done. In like manner, the Colorado case cited by the 
Morses, Bowers Bldg. Co. v. Altura Glass Co., Inc., 694 P.2d 876 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984), did not specifically address the doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel. Indeed, the Arizona Court of Appeals has 
recently upheld the doctrine of corporation by estoppel in Spurlock 
v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), as has the Court of 
Appeals of Colorado in Graham, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel 
Co., 680 P.2d 1334, 1335-36 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). 
The Morses make a statement in their Brief that no Utah case 
has ever recognized the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. 
Although many points of law have never reached the appellate level 
in the State of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized this 
doctrine in Nielson v. Smith, 107 P.2d 158 (Utah 1940). In that 
case, Nielson's predecessor, Charles D. Moore, had acquired the 
right to receive payments on a real estate contract, which payments 
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were originally made by John W. Smith. However, after Mr. Smith 
transferred his interest in the real property to Smith Land 
Company, a Utah corporation, the corporation made the payments, and 
Mr. Moore looked to the corporation for the payments. 
When the trial court pierced the corporate veil, Smith argued 
on appeal that Nielson was estopped to question the corporate 
existence, based upon the fact that his predecessor, Mr. Moore, 
recognized, dealt with and accepted payments from the corporation. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court recognized this doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel, the Court held that "[i]t cannot be said, 
therefore, that acceptance of payments by Moore from the Land 
Company bound his successors to a recognition of the legality and 
regularity of organization of the corporation." 3x1. at 162.10 
Thus, this doctrine is recognized in Utah, contrary to the Morses' 
assertion in their Brief. 
The Morses argue that, even if the doctrine of corporation by 
estoppel is recognized by the court, it is not available to Durbano 
and Garn, based primarily upon an analysis found in the Model 
Business Corporation Act.11 Although this analysis may be 
comprehensive, it is certainly not objective. Under the Model Act, 
anything short of a de jure corporation is not recognized. 
10
 Implied in the Court's holding is that the predecessor 
Moore, who looked to the corporation for payment on the obligation, 
would thereby be estopped from denying the corporate existence. In 
like manner, the Morses should also be estopped from denying 
Fairfield's corporate existence, since they looked to Fairfield for 
payment on the promissory note (R. at 2874). 
11
 See discussion of the Model Act and its influence on the 
doctrines of de. facto corporation and corporation by estoppel on 
pp. 55-57 of this Brief. 
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However, a review of case law on the issue of corporation by 
estoppel reveals that the trial court correctly ruled that 
Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel. 
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is not a new one. On 
the contrary, it is well established in the case law of many 
jurisdictions, including Utah. Jackson v. Crown Point Min. Co., 59 
P. 238, 240 (Utah 1899); Santaauin Min. Co. v. High Roller Min. 
Co., 71 P. 77, 80 (Utah 1903). In an often cited case, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama stated: 
[Iincidents of corporate existence may exist as between 
the parties by virtue of an estoppel....Thus, besides 
corporations de jure and de facto, there can be a 
recognition of a third class known as "Corporations by 
estoppel.". . ., the only effect of an estoppel being to 
prevent the raising of the question of the existence of 
a corporation. 
Bukacek v. Pell City Farms, Inc., 237 So.2d 851, 853 (Ala. 1970). 
The Supreme Court of Alaska has declared that "'Corporation by 
estoppel' is actually a misnomer for the result of applying the 
policy whereby private litigants may, by their agreements, 
admissions, or conduct, place themselves in a position where they 
will not be permitted to deny the fact of the existence of a 
corporation." Willis v. City of Valdez, 546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 
1976). Because of the fundamental legal principles which make up 
the framework of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel and its 
effectual purpose, it is "undoubtedly well founded in the law." 
Brandtien & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs, 288 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Or. 1955) 
(citation omitted). 
"Corporations by estoppel are not based upon the same 
principles as corporations de facto." Bukacek, 237 So.2d at 853; 
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Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 131 S.E. 517, 521 (Ga. 1926). 
"Estoppel may prevail where there is no color of incorporation 
. . ." JEd. See also, Cranson v. IBM, 200 A.2d 33, 39 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1964). Thus, the finding of corporation de facto is not a 
prerequisite to a finding of corporation by estoppel. "A 
'corporation by estoppel'. . .can arise only from actions and 
conduct of parties which place them in such a position that they 
[will] not be permitted to deny the existence of the corporation." 
Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Ark. 1972) (citation 
omitted). While a corporation as a legal entity may not actually 
be created by estoppel, under certain circumstances, an organiza-
tion not necessarily de jure or de facto may, so far as the parties 
to the transaction are concerned, be for all practical intents and 
purposes regarded as a corporation. 
Since corporation by estoppel is based upon equity principles, 
no hard and fast mechanical test has been developed to rule when a 
corporation by estoppel exists. However, the courts have fashioned 
two solid criteria, supported by dictates of justice and equity, 
which, if either is met, support such a ruling. The first of these 
is that a person or entity who contracts with a corporation as such 
is estopped to deny its corporate existence. 18A Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations §262; Lettinga v. Agristor Credit Corp., 686 F.2d 442, 
446 (6th Cir. 1982); and Chick v. Tomlinson, 531 P.2d 573, 576 
(Idaho 1975). The second criteria is that where a defendant, sued 
by a plaintiff representing itself to be a corporation, either 
admits the plaintiff's corporate existence in his answer or files 
a counterclaim in the action, the defendant is estopped from 
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denying plaintiff's corporate existence. 18A Am. Jur. 2d Corpora-
tions §272. Since the evidence at trial in this case established 
that both criteria were clearly met, based upon equity considera-
tions, fundamental contract principles, and the intentions of the 
parties, Fairfield is a corporation by estoppel and the Morses are 
estopped from denying its corporate existence. 
A. The Morses are estopped from denying the corporate 
existence of Fairfield by execution of the sales documents. 
One of the majority of jurisdictions supporting this principle 
is the State of Oregon. In Brandtien, 288 P.2d at 1025, the Oregon 
Supreme Court addressed an action brought by the seller of a 
printing press against the purchaser for breach of contract. 
Throughout the transaction, the plaintiff had represented itself as 
a corporation, as evidenced by the documentation of the 
transaction. As a defense, the defendant claimed that the 
plaintiff was not a corporation, and thus, the contract was void. 
The Oregon Supreme Court, citing Fletcher on Corporations, stated 
"a person who contracts or otherwise deals with a body of men as a 
corporation thereby admits that they are a corporation, and is 
estopped to deny their incorporation, in an action against him 
based upon or arising out of such contract or course of dealing." 
Id. at 1028 (citation omitted). 
As applied to the instant case, the holding in Brandtien 
supports the trial court's finding that the Morses are estopped 
from denying the corporate existence of Fairfield. Durbano and 
Gam testified consistently that they always intended to do 
business as a corporation and that they communicated that intent to 
the Morses, even soliciting their advice concerning the limitation 
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of liability on the Carwash operation (R. at 2869). Even Mr. Morse 
testified that he was never told by anyone but only speculated that 
Durbano and Gam were purchasing the Carwash individually (R. at 
2868). Mr. Morse also testified that he conveyed the Carwash to 
Fairfield and that there were no sale documents under any other 
name (R. at 2875-76), which is supported by all of the documentary 
evidence as well. Based upon all the contractual evidence 
submitted at trial, this court should affirm the trial court's 
finding that the Morses are estopped from denying the corporate 
existence of Fairfield. 
This conclusion is also supported by Bukacek, supra, 237 So. 
2d at 851, in which the plaintiff dealt with the defendant as a 
corporation and voluntarily executed a deed transferring property 
to the corporation prior to the filing of its Articles of 
Incorporation. When the plaintiff filed a quiet title action 
seeking to have the conveyance set aside, the Supreme Court of 
Alabama held that the plaintiff was precluded from denying the 
corporate existence, stating: 
[I]nsofar as the transaction here is concerned, it should 
be regarded practically as a corporation, being 
recognized as such by the parties themselves. In other 
words, the incidents of corporate existence may exist as 
between the parties by virtue of an estoppel. . . 
. . .[A]s between themselves and in connection with their 
own private litigations as here involved they may, by 
their agreements or their conduct estop themselves from 
denying the fact of the existence of the corporation. 
Id. at 853. 
Bukacek is directly applicable to the present case. The 
evidence presented at trial established that Articles of 
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Incorporation were submitted prior to the closing on the Carwash 
but were rejected for unavailable names. Although the final 
Articles had been prepared at the time of the closing on July 10, 
1985, they were not actually filed until August 19, 1985. However, 
since the Morses executed the sale documents with Fairfield as a 
corporation12, they are now estopped from denying the corporate 
existence. See also, Cranson, 200 A.2d at 34 (the doctrine of 
corporation by estoppel should be "generally employed where the 
person seeking to hold the officer personally liable has contracted 
or otherwise dealt with the association in such a manner as to 
recognize and in effect admit its existence as a corporate body"); 
Namerdv. 217 A. 2d at 112 (the defendant was estopped to deny the 
plaintiff's corporate status by execution of agreement stating that 
the plaintiff was a corporation). Based on the evidence admitted 
at trial and the general case law, this court should affirm the 
trial court's finding of corporation by estoppel, precluding the 
Morses from now denying the corporate existence of Fairfield. 
B. The Morses are also estopped from denying the corporate 
existence of Fairfield by their Answer and Counterclaim. 
The second criteria which court's have used to preclude 
denials of corporate existence is based on the intentions of the 
parties as evidenced by their pleadings. For example, in Brandtien 
discussed above, in answering the plaintiff's complaint, the 
defendant included a counterclaim against the plaintiff as a 
corporation. Based upon the pleadings, the Oregon Supreme Court 
12
 Mr. Morse also testified that he understands the concept of 
corporations and the limitation of liability of shareholders of a 
corporation (R. at 2863-64). 
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found that the defendant had admitted the existence of the 
plaintiff as a corporation and was estopped from any later attempt 
to deny such existence, stating: 
[W]e express the belief that it is well established that 
. . . a defendant who is sued by a business unit which 
alleges its existence as a corporation and who includes 
in his answer a counterclaim, cannot, upon the trial, 
refute the averment concerning the plaintiff's corporate 
existence. 
Brandtien, 288 P.2d. at 1029.13 
Brandtien is also directly applicable to the instant case. 
This action was brought against the Morses by Fairfield, alleging 
its corporate existence. In answering the Complaint, not only did 
the Morses admit the allegation of Fairfield's corporate existence, 
but the Morses also brought a Counterclaim against Fairfield for 
breach of the promissory note. In addition, the Morses subsequent-
ly served a Notice of Default upon Durbano as registered agent of 
Fairfield. By such actions, the Morses are estopped by the record 
from denying Fairfield's corporate existence. Based upon that 
estoppel, the Morses have no claim against Durbano and Garn 
individually, since their actions were only as representatives of 
the corporation. 
In their Brief, the Morses concede that in their Answer and 
Counterclaim they have admitted the corporate existence of 
Fairfield, but that they haven't admitted the corporate existence 
at the time of closing. However, this is splitting hairs. The 
case law cited above is clear that a party who admits the corporate 
existence in an answer or counterclaim is estopped from denying the 
13
 See also, Spurlock, 694 P.2d at 314; Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 
1449. 
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corporate existence. In addition, the fact that all documentation 
created at the time of closing named Fairfield as the purchaser of 
the Carwash is an admission on the part of the Morses that the 
corporation did exist at the time of closing. To allow the Morses 
to contract with the corporation and then deny its existence at the 
time of closing would "accomplish an unjust and inequitable result 
in favor of plaintiffs contrary to their own contractual 
expectations." Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398 A.2d 571, 
573 (N.J. Ct. App. 1979). Thus, this court should affirm the trial 
court's finding that Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel at the 
time of closing. 
In addition to being contrary to well settled law, allowing 
the Morses to maintain an action against Durbano and Garn would set 
a precedent that would inevitably and undesirably slow the wheels 
of commerce. By allowing parties to enter contracts, and then 
later, to directly contradict their express intentions as evidenced 
by their contract documents, the court would be encouraging 
contractual breaches. Any encouragement of this nature is 
obviously contrary to public policy. Rather, this court should 
honor the parties' right to contract and acknowledge the bargains 
the parties make according to their evidenced intentions. Any 
judgment which usurps the clear intentions of the parties works an 
injustice, undermines freedom of contract, and is contrary to the 
policies of equity and justice upon which the courts are founded. 
The Morses' final argument that corporation by estoppel was 
improperly found by the trial court, because Durbano and Garn 
ignored the corporate existence, is contrary to the evidence at 
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trial.14 Although the formal organizational meeting was not held 
until January 1, 1986, corporate meetings were held regularly 
throughout 1985, some of which Mr. Morse was asked to attend. 
Also, although the actual checks written to purchase the Carwash 
were from the account of Durbano and Garn's partnership, American 
Food Services, that was done only to save the expense of setting up 
a new checking account for the corporation until the purchase of 
the Carwash was assured, and the funds in the amount of $20,000.00, 
as down payment for the Carwash, were contributed by Durbano and 
Garn personally to the corporation which, in turn, purchased the 
Carwash (R. at 2463-64, 2551-57, 2608-09, 2656-59, 2665). 
In preparing tax and accounting documents, the accountant for 
both the partnership and the corporation did not know what entity 
had purchased the Carwash but exercised independent discretion in 
his work, to maximize the tax benefits to Durbano and Garn, who 
intended to own the corporation under an S election, the tax 
consequences of which would have been the same if they had owned 
the Carwash as a partnership (R. at 2464-66, 2520-21, 2532-33, 
2648-51, 2726-27, 2729, 2732-33, 2742-44). And finally, when short-
falls occurred, which they regularly did, in the corporate checking 
14
 Although the trial judge is in the best position to properly 
assess the credibility of the witnesses on this issue, the Morses' 
lack of credibility, which is quite evident on the record, is no 
doubt why the trial judge essentially disregarded their testimony. 
Not only was their testimony often contradictory to their prior 
depositions (R. at 2901-06, 2974-75), but their testimony at trial 
was also often controverted by the testimony of non-party witnesses 
(R. at 2880, 2892, 2894, 2985, 3001-06, 3033-34; Affidavit of 
Michelle Kirchhefer found in the Addendum to this Brief). In 
contrast, the testimony of Durbano and Garn was never questioned at 
trial by use of their prior depositions and was consistently in 
harmony with the testimony of all witnesses except the Morses. 
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account, money was transferred to it from the partnership checking 
account, but the funds came from the individuals in their capacity 
as shareholders of the corporation (R. at 2408, 2664, 2691-92, 
2696-97). Thus, Durbano and Garn never ignored the corporate 
existence and always treated the Carwash as a corporate asset. In 
weighing the equities of this case, this court should affirm the 
trial court's finding of no individual liability on the part of 
Durbano and Garn. 
In Summary, the Morses should be precluded from denying 
Fairfield's corporate existence, and further, from maintaining an 
action against Durbano and Garn personally, for three reasons; (1) 
the Morses dealt and contracted with Durbano and Gam's association 
(Fairfield) as a corporation, thereby creating a corporation by 
estoppel; (2) the Morses admitted the corporate existence in their 
Answer and brought a Counterclaim against Fairfield as a 
corporation, thereby acknowledging and admitting the corporate 
existence; and (3) allowing the Morses to maintain an action 
against Durbano and Garn would be contrary to public policy. The 
Morses, having made an election between two courses, with knowledge 
of the facts, have estopped themselves from pursuing the course 
they did not choose. They cannot, in one breath, rely upon the 
want of corporate existence so as to hold the individuals 
personally liable, and in the next, claim that the corporation does 
exist in support of their claim against it. In other words, the 
Morses cannot have their cake and eat it too. Based upon the 
evidence submitted at trial, this court should affirm the trial 
54 
court's finding that Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel at the 
time the Agreement was executed. 
The Morses spend a great deal of time in their Brief 
discussing the Model Business Corporation Act and the official 
comments to it. Since the Model Act has been adopted in one form 
or another in every state, it is interesting to survey how other 
states have handled the "bright-line" argument found in the 
comments to the Model Act and cited in the Morses' Brief. 
According to the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 
Third Edition, 1992 Supplement, thirty states have adopted a 
statute similar to U.C.A. §16-10-139, concerning liability of 
persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority, and 
all fifty states have adopted a statute similar to U.C.A. §16-10-
51, that the corporate existence begins upon either the filing of 
Articles or the issuance of a Certificate of Incorporation. 
However, in spite of the adoption by so many states of these two 
provisions of the Model Act, almost all states still recognize the 
doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel. 
A survey of cases reported only in the last ten years reveals 
that the following states currently recognize the doctrine of de 
facto corporation: Connecticut—In re Martin-Trigona, 760 F.2d 
1334 (2nd Cir. 1985); Kansas—State ex rel McCain v. Construction 
Enterprises, Inc., 631 P. 2d 1240 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Florida— 
Ratner v. Central Nat. Bank of Miami, 414 So.2d 210 (Fla. Ct. App. 
3 Dist. 1982); New York—Clinton Investors Co. v. Watkins, 536 N.Y. 
S.2d 270 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1989); Mississippi—Matter of Whatlev, 
874 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1989); Illinois—Davane, Inc. v. Monqreiq, 
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550 N.E.2d 55 (111. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1990); Arkansas—Committee for 
Utility Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 718 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1986); 
Massachusetts—In re David's & Unique Eatery, 82 B.R. 652 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 1987); Ohio—Fleischauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290 (6th 
Cir. 1989), cert, denied 493 U.S. 1074 and 494 U.S. 1027 (1989); 
Iowa—Adams v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868 (Iowa 
1984); and New Jersey—Cantor, 398 A.2d at 571. 
A similar survey of cases cited only during the last ten years 
also reveals that the following states currently recognize the 
doctrine of corporation by estoppel: Louisiana—Southern-Gulf 
Marine Co. No. 9, Inc. v. Camcraft, Inc., 410 So.2d 1181 (La. Ct. 
App. 3 Cir. 1982); Arizona—Spurlock, 694 P.2d at 299; Michigan— 
Lettinga, 686 F.2d at 442; Texas—Gensco, Inc. v. Canco Equipment, 
Inc. , 737 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. Amarillo 1987); Nebraska— 
Forker Solar, Inc. v. Knoblauch, 396 N.W.2d 273 (Neb. 1986); 
Missouri—Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. JEM Development Corp., 
740 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Minnesota—Arbo Corp. v. Ardan 
Marketing/Distribution, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 1512 (D. Minn. 1986); 
California—Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F.Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 
1987); New York—Puma Indus. Consulting, Inc. v. Daal Associates, 
Inc. , 808 F.2d 982 (2nd Cir. 1987); Illinois—Davane, 550 N.E.2d at 
55; and Georgia—Pinson v. Hartsfield Int'l Commerce Center, 382 
S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
A look at reported cases from all states for the past twenty 
or thirty years would no doubt reveal many more states that still 
recognize the doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by 
estoppel, notwithstanding their adoption of the Model Act. In 
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fact, apparently the only state whose judiciary has construed the 
Model Act to abolish corporation by estoppel entirely is Tennessee. 
Thus, a review of the Model Act and its adoption by the 
various states, as well as case law as cited above, reveals that in 
spite of adoption of the Model Act, most states still recognize the 
doctrine of de facto corporation and almost all states recognize 
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. Indeed, as the 
annotations to the Model Act state: 
These doctrines evolved at a time when most state 
statutes included a significant number of prerequisites 
to incorporation; their importance has declined as the 
incorporation process has been simplified. Nonetheless, 
they continue to be applied or referred to in many modern 
decisions involving situations in which the simplified 
incorporation procedures have not been fully complied 
with. 
Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Third Edition, 1992 
Supplement, p. 135 (emphasis added). Based upon the above 
authority, this court should affirm the trial court's finding that 
Fairfield existed at the time of closing on the Carwash both as a 
de facto corporation and as a corporation by estoppel. 
IX. 
The Trust Was Not Prejudiced by the Trial Court's Ruling 
on Attorney's Fees. 
On March 10, 1992, the trial court entered judgment in favor 
of the Trust against Fairfield in the amount of $76,832.30, with 
after accruing interest at the statutory rate and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. The Morses promptly filed a Motion for Determin-
ation of Attorney Fees (R. at 2029-30), accompanied by an Affidavit 
of Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements (R. at 
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2031-98). On March 31, 1992, counsel for Durbano and Gam filed a 
Response (R. at 2106-09), and on April 6, 1992, counsel for 
Fairfield filed a Response (R. at 2113-33). 
Of particular significance is the fact that on April 1, 1992, 
the Morses filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on the issue of 
attorney's fees (R. at 2110-12). It was not until April 10, 1992, 
that the trial court ruled on the attorney's fees issue, awarding 
$11,243.00 (R. at 2136). Finally, on April 14, 1992, the Morses 
filed a supplemental Affidavit of Attorney Fees (R. at 2137-2203) 
and a Reply Memorandum on their Motion (R. at 2204-12). One day 
later, on April 15, 1992, the Morses filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Attorney's Fees with an accompanying 
Memorandum (R. at 2213-16). However, on May 12, 1992, the trial 
court denied the Motion for Reconsideration (R. at 2230). 
The Morses state in their Brief that the Trust was prejudiced 
by the trial court's disregard of Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. The Morses argue that the trial court 
should not have considered the responses to their motion concerning 
attorneys fees, because the responses were filed after the deadline 
provided in Rule 4-501. However, what the Morses fail to recognize 
is that the rule itself contains the remedy for this situation. 
"If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition 
to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court 
for decision as provided in paragraph 1(d) of this rule." Rule 4-
501(1)(b), Rules of Judicial Administration. The Morses failed to 
comply with this provision until after one of the responses was 
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filed. Until a Notice to Submit for Decision is submitted, the 
trial court is not at liberty to rule on the motion. Rule 4-
501(1)(d), Rules of Judicial Administration. Thus, the Morses have 
no basis to complain that the trial court considered the responsive 
memorandum. 
The Morses also argue that the trial court prejudiced the 
Trust by ruling on the motion on April 10, 1992, without consider-
ing their reply memorandum and revised Affidavit of Attorney Fees, 
citing Gillmor v. Cuirmtings, 806 P. 2d 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
However, the holding in Gillmor did not address the failure of a 
court to consider a reply memorandum submitted after the same party 
had submitted a Notice to Submit for Decision. The court in 
Gillmor addressed a situation where the trial court ruled on a 
motion prior to the expiration of time for a responsive memorandum 
from the other side. Ici. at 1208. Since response memorandum are 
mandatory under Rule 4-501(1)(b), while reply memorandum are 
optional, Rule 4-501(1)(c), Gillmor does not support 
the reversal of the trial court's ruling on the issue of attorney's 
fees. 
The cases cited in Gillmor, which were decided under former 
rule 2.8(b), Utah R. Prac. D. & C. Ct., also addressed the failure 
of a court to consider a responsive pleading, not the movant's 
reply memorandum. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood 
Exploration, Inc. , 735 P.2d 62, 62-63 (Utah 1987); and K.O. v. 
Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 591 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Morses cannot 
cite the court to any precedence which would suggest that the trial 
court's order on attorney's fees should be set aside. Once a 
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Notice to Submit for Decision had been submitted by the Morses on 
their Motion, of necessity they should have withdrawn the Notice, 
if they desired to submit a reply memorandum or revised affidavit. 
Fairfield should not be penalized by the Morses' failure to do so. 
For that reason, this court should not set aside the ruling on 
attorney's fees based on any violation of Rule 4-501, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
X. 
The Trial Court's Award of Attorney's Fees is Supported 
by the Record. 
The award of reasonable attorneys fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Jenkins v. Bailev. 676 P.2d 391, 393 
(Utah 1984). Initially the Morses requested $112,435.00 in 
attorney's fees, but later they reduced their request to 
$88,700.00, apparently in response to the opposing Memoranda. The 
trial court found a reasonable fee to be $11,243.00 and awarded 
that amount. The Morses argue that such award was an abuse of 
discretion, relying primarily on Dixie State Bank. However, such 
reliance is misplaced, as the facts in that case are strikingly 
different from the facts before the court in the case at bar. 
In Dixie State Bank, the bank brought a deficiency action on 
a vehicle loan, after repossession and sale of the vehicle, seeking 
a judgment in the amount of $3,858.84. JEd. at 992. When Brackens' 
motion to dismiss was denied, they answered and counterclaimed, 
seeking $5,000.00 in general damages and $200,000.00 in punitive 
damages, for wrongful repossession of the truck. Id,, at 986-87. 
Footnote 3 of the opinion clearly indicates the lack of merit of 
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the Brackens' defense and counterclaim, based upon a theory that 
the bank's computer converted the payment obligation from monthly 
to semi-annually, when such semi-annual payments would not even be 
sufficient to pay the current interest. Id. 
As further evidence of Brackens' unmeritorious defense and 
counterclaim, the parties reached a stipulation of settlement at 
the commencement of trial, under which the bank would be paid the 
full amount of principal and interest, plus costs, plus attorney's 
fees in whatever amount the court found reasonable, and the 
Brackens were given 90 days from entry of judgment to satisfy the 
judgment, in order to avoid execution. .Id. at 987. Although the 
trial court found attorney's fees in the amount of $4,847.50 to be 
reasonable, the court only awarded $1,500.00, citing public 
discontent over the level of attorney's fees and the amount of the 
judgment with interest being only $4,748.39, as justification for 
the reduction. Id. at 987, 992. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
increased the award of attorney's fees to that which the trial 
court found reasonable. .Id., at 991. 
As the facts recited above clearly indicate, Dixie State Bank 
is not at all analogous to the case at bar. In this case, 
Fairfield filed the Complaint and actively prosecuted its claim 
through the trial and beyond. Fairfield's allegation of 
misrepresentation, material breach, and mutual mistake were not 
unmeritorious, and the trial court's finding against Fairfield on 
its claim is currently on appeal before this court as well. 
Fairfield's position on its Complaint was not at all untenable, as 
the Bracken's position was on their answer and counterclaim. Thus, 
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the conduct of Fairfield in prosecuting its Complaint and defending 
against the Counterclaim did not convert a routine action into a 
"brouhaha" as the court in Dixie State Bank found the Brackens had 
done. .Id. For that reason, the holding in Dixie State Bank, based 
upon the facts therein, does not support a finding that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the 
Morses in the amount of $11,243.00. 
The general principles and practical guidelines set out in 
Dixie State Bank, however, are applicable and were briefed exten-
sively by Fairfield in its responsive memorandum on the issue of 
attorney's fees (R. at 2113-33). A brief summary applying these 
principles to the facts in this action supports the affirmance of 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
(1) The fee agreement should be in writing—No evidence of any 
fee agreement or that any fees were actually paid was ever 
presented to the trial court. If the fee agreement was for an 
hourly rate, the agreement should have been produced so that the 
rates contained therein could be compared to the Affidavit of 
Attorney Fees submitted to the court. If, on the other hand, the 
fee agreement was contingent, such should also be produced, because 
an award based upon hours incurred would be inappropriate. Based 
upon Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5, counsel for the Morses 
would only be entitled to the percentage found in the agreement. 
Without the fee agreement, the trial court is left to its own 
discretion in awarding attorney's fees. 
(2) The nature of the legal work performed must be specified-
-Instead of including detailed explanations of time spent, counsel 
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for the Morses often resorted to mere generalities and "padding" 
using such explanations as "analysis of the issues" or "legal 
research." Again, without descriptive entries, the court is left 
to its discretion on the award of attorney's fees. The Morses may 
have attempted to remedy this situation by filing a revised 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees. However, to recreate the detail behind 
such padded entries by memory years later would be impossible. For 
that reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to consider the revised Affidavit of Attorney Fees and in 
awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $11,243.00. 
(3) The reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case—It is clear that the Morses' counsel spent most of their time 
pursuing the Counterclaim against Durbano and Garn individually, 
the perceived "deep pockets," after admitting in their Answer the 
corporate existence of Fairfield. The trial court found the 
Counterclaim to be meritless against the individuals, which finding 
should be affirmed in this appeal. Fees incurred in unsuccessful 
prosecution are not awardable. Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856, 
858 (Utah 1984). Because the billing entries of the Morses' 
counsel made no distinction between fruitless pursuits and those 
that resulted in judgment against Fairfield, the trial court was 
again left to its discretion in awarding attorney's fees. 
Counsel for the Morses also spent significant time on 
frivolous squabbles regarding procedure and discovery, and in 
filing baseless motions such as for bad faith and sanctions, among 
others, preventing the case from going forward and needlessly 
incurring additional attorney's fees. The Morses' counsel also 
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assigned at least nine attorneys to the case, five of which were 
partners in the firm, resulting in obvious and expensive duplica-
tion of professional services. All of the time spent on the 
meritless Counterclaim against Durbano and Garn, frivolous motions 
and discovery squabbles, and time for new attorneys to get up to 
speed on the action, are unreasonable and such time should not be 
awarded. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
determining how much of the requested fees were for unreasonable 
time spent. 
(4) The novelty and difficulty of the issues involved—The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the novelty and difficulty of the 
issues involved is an important aspect for the trial court to 
consider in awarding attorney's fees. 1^. The issues in the 
instant case involve long standing and well settled principles of 
law. Examples of this are de facto corporation, as discussed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Vincent Drug, supra. 407 P. 2d at 683, and 
contract interpretation, finding the intent of the parties within 
the four corners of the instrument, as stated also by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). These issues, upon which the case hinged 
and was subsequently decided, are clearly neither novel nor 
difficult. For that reason, attorney's fees in this action should 
have been minimal, which is no doubt only one of the reasons why 
the trial court awarded the amount it did. 
(5) The fee award should have some relationship to the amount 
in controversy and the amount recovered—The Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently held that there should be some reasonable relationship 
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between the award and (1) the amount in controversy, Dixie State 
Bank, 764 P.2d at 989, and (2) the amount recovered, Travnor, 688 
P.2d at 858. The amount awarded on the promissory note was 
$45,000.00 plus interest. Had the Morses not filed their 
Counterclaim seeking personal liability on the part of Durbano and 
Garn, their defense of Fairfield's Complaint and prosecution of 
their simple claim for breach of promissory note could have both 
been accomplished at a cost not exceeding approximately $12,000.00. 
The trial court, with no evidence of a written fee agreement, only 
general and non-descript evidentiary support for the fees, and 
evidence of incredible inefficiency involving issues that are 
neither unique nor complex, using its best discretion, awarded 
attorney's fees in the amount of $11,423.00. Based upon the, 
record, this court should affirm such award. 
XI. 
Fairfield Should be Awarded its Attorney's Fees on 
Appeal. 
The basis for Fairfield's Complaint was the Agreement 
concerning the sale of the Carwash. The Agreement provides for 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in the event of breach 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, p. 13, I 22). Therefore, if Fairfield is 
successful on this appeal, it should be awarded its attorney's fees 
incurred in the appeal, as well as those incurred in the underlying 
action. Trayner, 688 P.2d at 858 n.7; Management Services Corp. 
v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). Similar-
ly, if Durbano and Garn are successful on this appeal, Fairfield 
should also be awarded its attorney's fees incurred on behalf of 
Durbano and Garn. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record and the arguments herein, Fairfield 
requests that this court (1) reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and order rescission of the Agreement on the basis of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach 
of contract, and/or mutual mistake; (2) reverse the trial court and 
grant Fairfield's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, 
adding causes of action for constructive trust, fraudulent 
transfer, and injunctive relief; (3) reverse the trial court and 
grant Fairfield's Motion to Set Aside the Fraudulent Conveyance of 
the Morses' interest in the promissory note to their Trusts; (4) 
reverse the trial court and grant Fairfield's Motion for Order 
Declaring Trusts Invalid, declaring the Morses' Trusts invalid; (5) 
reverse the trial court and grant Fairfield's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, dismissing the Counterclaim as to Fairfield, if 
not inconsistent with the other rulings on appeal; (6) reverse the 
trial court and order that the Morses' Bankruptcy Trustee, David 
Gladwell, be joined as the real party in interest in this action; 
and (7) award Fairfield all attorney's fees incurred in this appeal 
and in the underlying action below, including fees incurred on 
behalf of Durbano and Garn. 
Based upon the record and the arguments herein, Durbano and 
Garn request that this court affirm the trial court's finding that 
Fairfield existed at the time of closing as a de facto corporation 
and also as a corporation by estoppel, and that Durbano and Garn 
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have no personal liability on the judgment entered by the trial 
court against Fairfield. ^ 
DATED this Lp day of Docombor/ 109-2-^  
DURBANO AND ASSOCIATES 
Douglas M. Durbartb 
Walter T. Merriil 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
^ot^rt' K. Hilder^ 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Durbano and Garn 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/ 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs, 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE, 
individually and as Trustees 
for the WAYNE L. MORSE 
Irrevocable Family Trust, and 
DAVID GLADWELL, 
Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and 
KEVIN S. GARN, 
Involuntary Plaintiffs/ 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 900906228 
This matter came on regularly for trial, commencing the 
15th day of October, 1991, with Douglas Durbano appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiff; James L. Christensen and Michael Lee 
appearing on behalf of the stipulated real party defendant, the 
Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust; and with Craig G. 
Adamson and Eric Lee appearing on behalf of the involuntary 
nni nr/> 
AM. VENDING V. MORSE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
plaintiffs/counterclaim defendants, Durbano and Garn. The 
matter of the issues raised by the pleadings filed in this case 
were fully presented, argued and submitted, and the matter of 
the Court's decision thereon was taken under advisement. The 
Court having thereafter reviewed the evidence, together with 
the submissions of counsel, and the arguments of counsel, now 
makes its ruling and decision on said issues, as follows: 
This action was commenced by the plaintiff seeking to 
rescind a contract whereby plaintiff agreed to purchase a car 
wash from the defendant. Plaintiff has alleged as grounds for 
rescission claimed fraud and misrepresentation of the 
defendant, and breach of the sales contract and a mutual 
mistake based on mistake of fact. Defendant has denied the 
allegations and seeks by Counterclaim against the individual 
involuntary plaintiffs to recover under a promissory note given 
to purchase the car wash. The involuntary plaintiffs deny 
personal liability, claiming the purchaser was in fact a 
corporation, to wit: American Vending Services, Inc., the 
named plaintiff. 
It is undisputed and the evidence supports a finding that 
the documents regarding the sale and purchase of the car wash 
were signed by purchasers in the name of American Vending 
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Services, Inc. None of the documents were signed by Durbano or 
Gam as individuals. It is further undisputed that the 
corporate documents were filed subsequent to the signing of the 
sale documents, and that no corporation existed at the time the 
sale was concluded. Durbano and Gam, however, claim that 
there was a de facto corporation, or a corporation by estoppel, 
because defendant knew that it was dealing with a corporation, 
rather than a partnership comprised of Durbano and Garn. 
The Court will find that there was no evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, or mutual mistake which 
would permit plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. the 
right to rescind the contract or the promissory note. 
The Court will find that the evidence supports a finding 
that the plaintiff was a de facto corporation at the time of 
the signing of the contract to purchase and the promissory note 
in question in that the defendants were aware of and had 
knowledge of the fact that they were dealing with a 
corporation, rather than the individual involuntary plaintiffs. 
Based upon the foregoing ruling, the Court will further 
rule that plaintiffs are not entitled to their claim for 
rescission. The Court further finds that defendant Wayne L. 
Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is entitled to and is awarded a 
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Judgment on the contract and promissory note for the unpaid 
balance thereon against plaintiff American Vending Services, 
Inc. Defendant's claim for Judgment against involuntary 
plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants Douglas M. Durbano and 
Kevin S. Garn is denied. Defendant is awarded its costs 
taxable against the plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. 
Dated this day of November',' 
JAMES S. SAWJKA" 
[•RICT COURT JUDGE 
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of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
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Douglas M. Durbano 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Ogden, Utah 84403 
Craig G. Adamson 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendants 
310 S. Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James L. Christensen 
Michael Lee 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Eric P. Lee (4870) 
Attorneys for Involuntary Plaintiffs 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, 
INC., n\k\a Fairfield Car 
Wash Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE, 
individually and as Trustees 
for the Wayne L. Morse and 
Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable 
Family Trust; DAVID L. 
GLADWELL, Bankruptcy Trustee, 
Defendants/ 
Counterclaiinants, 
v. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and 
KEVIN S. GARN, 
Involuntary Plaintiffs/ 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
oooOooo 
This matter came on for trial commencing on October 15, 1991. 
Douglas M. Durbano appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, James L. 
Christensen appeared on behalf of the stipulated real party 
defendant, the Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust, and Craig 
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G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of the involuntary 
Plaintiffs. Having received exhibits, heard the testimony of the 
witnesses and the arguments of counsel, the Court took the matter 
under advisement and issued its Memorandum Decision on November 18, 
1991. Based on the Memorandum Decision, the evidence and arguments 
of counsel at trial, the Court hereby enters its, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Wayne L. Morse and Dianne L. Morse were the owners and 
operators of a car wash and office building located in Layton, 
Utah. 
2. In the Summer of 1985, involuntary plaintiffs Douglas M. 
Durbano and Kevin S. Garn determined that they would form a 
corporation to purchase the car wash and office building from the 
Morses. Throughout the negotiations for the purchase, the Morses 
knew that Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn intended to form a corporation 
for this purpose. 
3. Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn, as incorporators, decided on 
the corporate name American Food Service, Inc. and filed articles 
of incorporation with the State of Utah. The articles were 
rejected and returned to Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn because the name 
American Food Services, Inc. conflicted with an existing corporate 
name. 
4. Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn then changed the corporate name 
to American Food and Vending Services and submitted articles of 
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incorporation a second time. The articles were again rejected 
because of name conflict. Both sets of articles were submitted 
prior to July, 1985. 
5. On June 28, 1985, Mr. Durbano obtained preapproval for 
the use of the name American Vending Services, Inc. for the 
corporation. 
6. The transaction closed on July 10, 1985 when American 
Vending Services, Inc. as buyer and Mr. and Mrs. Morse as sellers 
executed a Purchase and Sales Agreement. 
7. None of the documents generated in connection with the 
sale of the car wash and office building were executed by either 
Mr. Durbano or Mr. Garn as buyer. All documents were prepared for 
signature by and were signed by American Vending Services, Inc. 
8. An attorney representing Mr. and Mrs. Morse reviewed the 
transaction documents prior to closing and made no objection to a 
corporate buyer. 
9. Following the closing, American Vending Services, Inc. 
continued doing business by obtaining a checking account, operating 
the car wash and office building, issuing stock and holding 
meetings. 
10. Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn's efforts to file articles of 
incorporation and obtain preapproval for the name American Vending 
Services prior to closing constitute a bona fide attempt to 
organize the corporation. 
3 
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11. Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn intended to have the articles 
of incorporation for American Vending Services, Inc. filed prior to 
closing, but failed to accomplish the filing until August 19, 1985 
due to the distraction of Mr. Durbano opening a new law office just 
prior to the closing, the closing itself and the process of 
commencing business. 
12. Due to what Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn believed to be 
misrepresentations regarding the income potential of the car wash 
and office building, American Vending Services, Inc. instituted 
this action on October 31, 1985 seeking rescission of the purchase 
transaction. In their initial Answer, Mr. and Mrs. Morse admitted 
the corporate existence of American Vending Services, Inc. 
13. Mr. and Mrs. Morse intended to contract with American 
Vending Services, Inc., rather than Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn 
individually. 
14. Due to a name change in 1990, American Vending Services, 
Inc. is now known as Fairfield Car Wash Corporation. 
15. The evidence concerning fraud, misrepresentation, breach 
of contract and mutual mistake was insufficient to permit American 
Vending Services, Inc. the right to rescind the contract. 
16. The parties1 agreement provides for the recovery of a 
reasonable attorney's fee upon breach. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
makes and enters its, 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. was a de facto 
corporation at the time it purchased the subject car wash and 
office building. 
2. Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. was a 
corporation by estoppel at the time it purchased the subject car 
wash and office building. 
3. Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is 
estopped from denying the corporate existence of Plaintiff American 
Vending Services, Inc. 
4. Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. breached the 
parties1 agreement by failing to pay all sums due under the 
Promissory Note. 
5. Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. failed to 
establish the elements of its claims for fraud, misrepresentation, 
breach of contract and mutual mistake. 
6. Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust failed 
to prove the elements of its claims against Mr. Durbano and Mr. 
Garn and its claims against them should be dismissed. 
7. Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is 
entitled to damages against Plaintiff American Vending Services, 
Inc. only in the amount of $76,832.30, with costs, interest and a 
reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be determined pursuant to 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-505 (1989). 
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DATED t h i s /O day of 
rHONipRABLE JAMES S^ SAWAYA 
s t r i c t Court judge 
Approved a s t o form: 
James L. C h r i s t e n s e n 
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Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
Attorneys for Involuntary Plaintiffs 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, 
INC., n/k/a FAIRFIELD 
CAR WASH CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE, 
individually and as Trustees 
for the Wayne L. Morse and 
Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable 
Family Trust; DAVID L. 
GLADWELL, Bankruptcy Trustee, 
Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and 
KEVIN S. GARN, 
Involuntary Plaintiffs/ 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
OOOOOOO 
00202R 
This matter came on for trial before the above-captioned 
Court commencing on October 15, 1991. Douglas M. Durbano appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc., James L. 
Christensen appeared on behalf of the stipulated real party 
defendant, the Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust, and Craig 
G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of the involuntary 
Plaintiffs Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Gam. Based on the 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of even date, and 
good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is 
awarded Judgment against Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc., 
n\k\a Fairfield Car Wash Corporation in the total amount of 
$76,832.30, with after accruing interest at the statutory rate 
until paid and a reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be 
determined pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-
505 (1989) . 
2. Plaintiff American Vending Service, Inc. ' s claims against 
Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust are dismissed 
with prejudice. 
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3. Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust's 
claims against involuntary Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants 
Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Gajrp ar^ dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this /& day of Tt ft^TVTi^, 199; 
Approved as to form: 
James L. Christensen 
JLE JAMES S. ^ fiWAYA 
5t Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WAYNE L. MORSE and DIANNE L. 
MORSE, individually and as 
Trustees of the WAYNE L. MORSE 
Irrevocable Family Trust, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
DOUGLAS M. 
S. GARN, 
DURBANO and KEVIN 
Involuntary 
Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No. 900906228CV 
(Judge James S. Sawaya) 
6?/72?6 3 
Defendants and counterclaimants7 Motion for Determination of 
Attorney Fees having been considered by the court based upon a 
Notice to Submit for Decision dated April 1, 1992, and the court, 
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pursuant to that notice, having considered the motion, supporting 
ana opposing memoranda and affidavit of James L. Christensen, and 
not having considered defendants' reply memorandum and the 
additional affidavit of James L. Christensen, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that defendants' claimed attorney fees of $112,435.00 is 
excessive. The Court awards attorney fees to defendants of one-
tenth of the claimed amount, i.e. $11,243.00, and costs of 
$1,980.17. The judgment entered in favor of defendants dated 
March 10, 1992 is hereby amended to include the attorney fees and 
costs awarded herein, for a total judgment of $90,055.47 plus 
accrued interest. 
DATED this day of "^&<*y , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hotaorable James S. 
Third^District Court Judge 
002PQ9 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
To: Counsel for plaintiffs and involuntary plaintiffs and 
counterclaim defendants: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for 
defendants will submit the foregoing Order to Judge James S. 
Sawaya for his signature upon the expiration of (5) days from the 
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three days for 
mailing, or upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date 
you receive this proposed order, if hand-delivered, unless 
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1988). Please 
govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this Vfr-tikday of \A\A>\ , 1992. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
\f^(Jj^M 
James L. Christens^ 
Wallace J. Calder 
Attorneys for defendants 
£ ^ 
18 Dnon^^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the A g ^ d a y of 
1992, I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Durbano & Associates 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3340 Harrison Blvd. #200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Craig G. Adamson 
Dart Adamson and Kasting 
Attorney for Involuntary Plaintiffs 
310 South Main #1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
David L. Gladwell 
4185 Harrison Blvd. 
P.O. Box 12069 
Ogden, UT 84412 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
FAIRFIELD CAR WASH CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
American Vending Services, Inc., 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs 
BRENT DOPP, as Trustee for the 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE 
IRREVOCABLE FAMILY TRUSTS, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants 
ORDER 
Re: Amendment of Parties 
to Pleadings and 
Temporary Restraining 
Order 
Civil No. 900906228 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Plaintiff having moved this court for a Temporary Restraining 
Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction, pursuant to 
Rule 65(A)(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to prevent or stop 
any alleged wrongful execution on the Judgment entered March 10, 
1992, said Motion having come on for hearing on July 27, 1992, 
Plaintiff having further moved this court to amend the pleadings in 
this action to correct the name of the Plaintiff (the Corporate 
Plaintiff having properly changed its name), and to delete the 
Involuntary Plaintiffs, who were dismissed from the action, the 
court having considered the Motions, Pleadings and argument of 
counsel, and good cause appearing, 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for 
Injunctive Relief is denied, the court finding that such motion is 
more properly brought in a separate civil action to be filed by the 
actual parties who are effected by the alleged wrongful execution; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the 
Compliant is granted, in that only the true parties in interest 
shall be named in the caption of all pleadings, and the caption 
specifically shall state and name or identify the parties as 
follows: 
FAIRFIELD CAR WASH CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a : 
American Vending Services, Inc., 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
BRENT DOPP, as Trustee for the 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE : 
IRREVOCABLE FAMILY TRUSTS, 
Civil No. 900906228 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. Judge James S. Sawaya 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the captions in all pleadings, 
executions, garnishments and orders, created after the judgment 
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES V. MORSE 
Civil No. 900906228 
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dated March 10, 1992, and prior to July 27, 1992, are hereby-
amended where appropriate to conform with this Order. 
DATED this % day of V ^ r * '. 1992. 
BY THJL4£URT: 
.JMES S. SAWAY; 
district Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, this day of July, 
1992 to the following: 
James L. Christensen 
Mark J. Morrise 
Wallace J. Calder 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Secretary 
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UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 25-6-5 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this sec-
tion requires merely a showing that the party's 
Allegation of insolvency.
 a 8 s e t s ^ n o t 8 u f f i c i e n t to m e e t liabilities as 
Determination of insolvency.
 fhsy b e c o m e d u e M e y e r y Q ^ ^ ^ Cor?f 
Allegation of insolvency. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an In an action by a creditor to set aside an 
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate 
as against contention that it was a conclusion, by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,48 P.2d 513,101 that the debtor was insolvent where the only 
A.L.R. 532 (1935). evidence was that the debtor submitted two 
Determination of insolvency. checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture 
The determination of insolvency under this Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 
section is not the same as the determination of (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Imputation of insolvency as de- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
famatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163. «=» 57(1). 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured 
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made 
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support 
to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a rea-
sonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an 
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or exe-
cution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the 
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor 
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact 
substantially contemporaneous. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or af-
ter transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or in-
curred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
25 
25-6-5 FRAUD 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transac-
tion for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably 
small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they 
became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may 
be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor 
had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reason-
ably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the trans-
fer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a 
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953, 
25-6-5. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
ANALYSIS 
Assignments. 
Badges of fraud. 
Construction and application. 
Constructive trust. 
Conveyances between relatives. 
Evidence. 
Fair consideration. 
"Good faith" transfer. 
Mortgagor remaining in possession. 
Parent and child. 
Assignments. 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, un-
accompanied by change of possession, is fraud-
ulent per se as to execution creditors of, or sub-
sequent purchasers from, seller or assignor 
does not necessarily apply to assignments for 
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking 
possession is circumstance from which fraud 
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Mur-
dock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899). 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors 
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511. 
Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, de-
lay or defraud creditors, or was made for such 
purpose, depends upon the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transaction, as gath-
ered from the badges of fraud present. 
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 
(1942). 
Badges of fraud. 
Although actual fraudulent intent must be 
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its ex-
istence may be inferred from the presence of 
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud." 
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1986). 
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent 
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's 
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the 
prerequisites of property ownership after hav-
ing formally conveyed all his interest in the 
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN VENDING 
SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. 
MORSE, individually and 
as Trustees for the 
WAYNE L. MORSE 
Irrevocable Family Trust, 
Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and 
KEVIN S. GARN, 
Involuntary 
Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
Deposition of J. SCOTT BUEHLER. taken on behalf 
of the Plaintiff, at 3340 Harrison Bouelvard, Suite 
200, Ogden, Utah, commencing at 10:30 a.m. on May 
23, 1991, before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant 
to Subpoena. 
* * * * 
STACY & ASSOCIATES 
717 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 328-1188 
CIVIL NO. 900906228 
D£PJOS-I-TTON 
J . SCOTT BUEHLE~] 
TAKEN: MAY 2 3 , 1 9 9 1 
REPORTED B Y : 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
COPY 
1 "administer"? 
2 Q Did you ever receive it in your capacity 
3 as trustee, countersign a check, deposit it? 
4 A Not to my knowledge. 
5 Q In your capacity as a trustee, have you 
6 been requested by the beneficiaries or settlors of 
7 the trust to pursue any legal action against the 
8 signers of Exhibit 3? 
9 A Once again, I would have to decline to 
10 answer on the ground that the lines between my 
11 capacity as trustee and attorney are blurred and, in 
12 view of that, any communications I would have had 
13 with regard to that I would have to say are 
14 privileged. 
15 Q Do you still serve as the trustee to 
16 either the Diane or Wayne L. Morse Family Trust? 
17 A I do not. 
18 Q You apparently resigned. 
19 A That's correct. 
20 Q And you didn't bring with you today any 
21 documents evidencing your resignation. 
22 A No, I did not. I will represent that I 
23 did resign -- I believe it was on February the 10th 
24 of 1986. I did that in the form of a letter to Mr. 
25 And Mrs. Morse. That letter contains other 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 16 
1 information which I believe to be of a privileged 
2 nature. 
3 Q Do you know who the successor trustee is 
4 or was back when you resigned? 
5 A I do not. I know that Brent Dopp is 
6 named as the successor or trustee in the trust 
7 document. 
8 Q And has he had any communications with 
9 you in regards to administering any assets of the 
10 trust? 
11 A Not to my recollection. 
12 Q And you've never represented Brent Dopp, 
13 have you? 
14 A I have represented Webber Real Estate 
15 Company on and off and Brent Dopp is the broker. He 
16 may have consulted with me from time to time with 
17 regard to matters pertaining to his real estate 
18 company. I have no recollection of ever 
19 representing Brent in any kind of a private or 
20 personal capacity. 
21 Q Have you had any communication with Brent 
22 at all in regards to his responsibility as a 
23 trustee? 
24 A If I had any communication with him at 
25 all, it would have been around the time that the 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 17 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN VENDING 
SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. 
MORSE, individually and 
as Trustees for the 
WAYNE L. MORSE 
Irrevocable Family Trust, 
Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and 
KEVIN S. GARN, 
Involuntary 
Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
Deposition of BRENT A. DOPP, taken on behalf of 
the Plaintiff, at 3340 Harrison Bouelvard, Suite 
200, Ogden, Utah, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on April 
18, 1991, before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant 
to Subpoena. 
STACY & ASSOCIATES 
717 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 328-1188 
CIVIL NO. 900906228 
DEPOSITION OF: 
BRENT A. DOPP 
TAKEN: APRIL 18, 1991 
REPORTED BY: 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
ORIGINAL 
1 (Whereupon Deposition 
Exhibits 1 and 2 were marked 
2 for identification.) 
3 Q Mr. Dopp, I'm showing you Exhibits 1 and 
4 2 together. Do you recognize these documents? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Have you seen them before, to the best of 
7 your recollection? 
8 A I honestly don't remember. I don't think 
9 I have, but I don't remember. 
10 Q As the title indicates, these are trust 
11 agreements that were set up by Wayne and Diane 
12 Morse. They're irrevocable family trusts that were 
13 prepared, I believe, January 15th of 1984; is that 
14 correct? 
15 A That's what it says here on the paper, 
16 yes. 
17 Q Are you aware that you are a named 
18 trustee in these trusts? 
19 A I'm aware that I was asked at one point 
20 if I would be willing to do that. I said that I 
21 would, yes. 
22 Q Do you recall when that was? 
23 A No. It was probably back somewhere 
24 around then, but I have no idea. I don't remember 
25 when. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
1 Q Then I take it you weren't involved in 
2 the creation of these trusts at all; is that 
3 correct? 
4 A No, I was not. 
5 Q Do you know who the beneficiaries of the 
6 trusts are? 
7 A No, I don't. 
8 Q I'd like to have you turn to page two, if 
9 you would, of either one. The trusts are 
10 identically worded, I believe. In paragraph 1.2, it 
11 names the beneficiaries of the trust as Collette 
12 Morse and Jessica Morse. Do you know these two 
13 individuals? 
14 A That's Diane and Wayne's children. 
15 Q How old are they; do you know? Just 
16 approximately, if you don't know their exact age. 
17 A Oh, I honestly don't. I think Collette 
18 is 10 or 11, and Jessica, I think, is 8. 
19 Q Today? That's their age today? 
20 A Well, I don't know. I'm guessing. 
21 Q I don't mean this specific date. I mean 
22 as opposed to back in '84. 
23 A Oh, yes. 
24 Q You're giving me their age currently? 
25 A Current, right. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
1 Q You've never received any documents 
2 concerning the trust? 
3 A Not to my knowledge, no. 
4 Q Do you know what assets are in the trust? 
5 A I have no idea. 
6 Q Have you done anything for the benefit of 
7 the beneficiaries of the trust since February of 
8 1986? 
9 A No. 
10 Q And you're not doing anything currently 
11 then, I understand. 
12 A No. 
13 Q Do you understand what your duties are as 
14 a trustee of a trust? 
15 A No, I don't. 
16 Q Are you familiar with a promissory note 
17 executed by American Vending, Inc. for the benefit 
18 of Wayne and Diane Morse as trustees of these two 
19 trusts? 
20 A No, I'm not. 
21 Q Have you ever seen that document? 
22 A Not that I can recall, no. 
23 Q Do you know if the Morses' children are 
24 still the beneficiaries of these trusts? 
25 A I have no idea. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 8 
i Q Has it been your intention since you 
2 agreed to be an alternate trustee in these trusts, 
3 was it your intention then and has it been since 
4 then, to act in that capacity if called upon to do 
5 so? 
6 A I would have had to have more 
7 information. They asked if I would be willing to do 
8 it. At the time I said yes, but I had no idea what 
9 it would involve or anything about it, so I -- you 
10 know, I can't answer that without knowing more about 
11 it. 
12 Q Did you say yes with the intention of not 
13 doing it? 
14 A Well, I said I would be willing to do it, 
15 but I needed to know more -- you know, know more 
16 about it. I have no idea what it involves. And 
17 there's been no more instruction or no more talk to 
18 me about doing it since that one time. 
19 Q Have you been contacted in the last year 
20 by either the Morses or their attorney, Mike Lee, or 
21 Jim Christensen, concerning your position as 
22 trustee? 
23 A No, I haven't. The only contact I've had 
24 with them concerning what we're talking about today 
25 is that I would be coming for a deposition, and 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
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that's it. 
Q Did they call you concerning this 
deposition? 
A Yes. 
Q What did they say to you? 
A Well, it was on the time situation, 
wanting to know if the times that were changed, if 
there was a problem in that. 
Q Who is it that actually contacted you? 
A Mike Lee. 
Q Mike Lee. And that was the only thing 
that he talked to you about was the day of the 
deposition? 
A He indicated that it would be on the 
trust and that was basically the extent of the 
conversation. 
MR. MERRILL: I think that's it. 
(Whereupon the taking of the deposition 
was concluded at 10:15 a.m.) 
* * * * 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 10 
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
EJURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Harrison Professional Plaza 
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #2.00 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE, 
individually and as Trustees for 
the WAYNE L. MORSE Irrevocable 
Family Trust, and DAVID GLADWELL, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and 
KEVIN S. GARN, 
Involuntary Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Michelle Kirchhefer, being first duly sworn upon his oath 
deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 21 and competent to be a witness 
herein. I am personally familiar with this matter, and all 
statements made herein are made upon personal knowledge, unless 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHELLE KIRCHHEFER 
Civil No. 900906228 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
otherwise stated that such statement is upon information and 
belief. 
2. That I was the .closing agent, employed by Bonneville 
Ti.tle jfka American Title Company, during the time period of 
approximately July 10, 1985, and was the individual who conducted 
the closing of the Fairfield Carwash, between American Vending 
Services, Inc. and Wayne L. and Dianne L. Morse. 
3. Closing is dated July 10, 1985, with all documents 
having been prepared in the name of American Vending Services, 
Inc., a Utah corporation as the buyer. 
4. In regards to scheduling the buyer and seller to appear 
at the closing, and sign documents, it is always my policy to 
keep the buyer and seller separate in order to avoid potential 
conflicts. To the best of my knowledge, in regards to the Carwash 
closing, that the Morses came in and signed the closing documents 
but that the officers for American Vending Services, Inc. 
(Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Garn) had trouble scheduling a 
time to close due to numerous time commitments and therefore the 
officers of American Vending Services came to the office and 
closed at a separate time than that of the Morses. 
5. I am informed that the Morses have represented that 
Douglas M. Durbano told them, at the time of closing, that 
American Vending Services, Inc. was not a corporation but merely 
a dba by which he and Kevin S. Garn do business. I have no 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
-2-
recollection of such a statement ever having been made. If in 
fact it would have been made, I would have known that such a 
statement was false, and that the documents did not comply with 
the understanding of the parties, and would have so informed the 
Morses, and either discontinued the closing or altered the 
closing documents to properly reflect the parties agreement. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this day of July, 1991. 
Sv&prn to and subscribed before me this /SY day of 
ILL LL , 1991 
^2*T 
Residing i n : ^ g ^ L 
My Commission Expires: %/ff) 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JANETTE SNYDER 
tMOHantton Blvd. #200 
O0*MMto«44O9 
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